Athens, 28 March 2007
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: Good morning. This morning, Foreign Minister Ms. Dora Bakoyannis opened the proceedings of the 10th Mediterranean Conference of the Red Cross at an Athens hotel.
Tomorrow, 29 March, the Minister will meet at 11:00 with the EU Commissioner for Institutional Relations and Communication Strategy, Ms. Wallstrom, within the framework of Ms. Wallstrom’s tour supporting the European Commission plan for the promotion of Europe. This is known as Plan D, the Plan for Democracy, Dialogue and Debate with European citizens regarding the future of Europe.
At 13:30 tomorrow, 29 March, the Minister will host a working luncheon for Ms. Wallstrom that will be attended by Deputy Foreign Minister Mr. Valinakis and Greece’s Commissioner, Mr. Dimas. Ms. Wallstrom’s itinerary also includes a meeting with the Prime Minister, as well as attendance at certain events, such as meetings with representatives of university students regarding the 50th anniversary of the European Union.
Also tomorrow, Ms. Bakoyannis will have a protocol meeting with the new Director General of the Cypriot Foreign Ministry, Ambassador Mr. Zinonas. Mr. Zinonas will also meet with his counterpart, the Secretary General of the Greek Foreign Ministry, Ambassador Mr. Rokanas.
On 30-31 March, the Foreign Minister will be in Bremen to participate in the Informal Council of EU Foreign Ministers – the Gymnich meeting.
The issues to be addressed at this Council include: On 30 March, the Western Balkans, with the focus on Kosovo; European Neighbourhood Policy; EU-Belarus relations. And on 31 March, they will discuss the Middle East peace process and the Iran issue.
Regarding the activities of the Deputy Foreign Ministers, I want to inform you that our country, following an initiative on the part of Deputy Foreign Minister Mr. Valinakis, will host a meeting of EU European Affairs Ministers on the subject of the “New European Sea Policy”, which will take place on Rhodes on 19 and 20 April. Ms. Bakoyannis is to open the proceedings with a welcome speech.
This Meeting is being held within the framework of consultations on the European Commission’s Green Book concerning the new European Policy on the sea. This is an effort to adopt a comprehensive policy on Europe’s seas and concerns economic development, the environment, research and innovation.
Let me give you some background here, as you seem interested. In March 2005, the Commission set up a special task force to draw up a comprehensive European policy on the sea, along the lines of similar policies of the US, Australia and Canada, in order for this policy to be set out in a specific document called the Green Book.
This was to happen in the first six months of 2006. The text was approved by the Commission on 7 June 2006. The period of consultations began within the framework of the Finnish Presidency, and by the end of 2007, the Commission will present the results of the consultations to the European Council and Parliament.
And I repeat that it is an effort toward a comprehensive setting out of policies concerning the sea, with emphasis on economic development, the environment, and research and innovation.
Today, 28 March, Deputy Foreign Minister Mr. Kassimis is in Armenia, where he is representing the Greek government at the funeral of Armenian Prime Minister Andranik Margaryan.
That’s it for announcements. Your questions, please.
Mr. Meletis: Will Mr. Rousopoulos be at the luncheon with Ms. Wallstrom?
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: I told you who will be attending this particular working lunch in honour of Ms. Wallstrom, who is visiting the Foreign Ministry, and at the Foreign Ministry a working luncheon is being hosted by the Foreign Minister for the Commissioner.
Ms. Rigou: I wanted to ask about the Kosovo issue and the Ahtisaari plan. There has been unanimous acceptance on the part of NATO, as is the case with the European Union. Is our position that the plan is acceptable even after the changes that have been made?
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: Allow me to make a slight correction. The European Union has not expressed itself on this. Second, the plan has not been accepted yet. It is support for the plan in principle. Moreover, there is no issue of acceptance or non-acceptance by NATO. It is not part of the procedure in progress.
Ms. Rigou: Our position?
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: As you know, the negotiations on this issue – the intensive negotiations between Belgrade and Pristina – lasted about a year and a half, since February 2006, with the mediation of Mr. Ahtisaari, whose efforts and team were supported by our country. After 23 rounds of intensive consultations and talks, it was ascertained that there was very limited common ground between the interested parties.
At this very critical stage of the process, Greece’s position is that all the sides must avoid unilateral actions that might derail the political process in progress and, of course, destabilize Kosovo, as well as the wider region.
From the outset of the negotiation process, Greece pointed to and stressed the factors of ensuring regional stability and security as being of paramount importance.
We believe that a viable solution can ensure stability and security. We believe that the solution found must bear the seal of international legality that only a Security Council resolution can guarantee.
Moreover, its is very important to bear in mind the European perspective of the whole region, which guarantees the forging of relations of cooperation as well as good neighbourly relations.
In our view, the fact that a unified position from the European Union must be secured is very important; of particular importance.
Beyond that, it is certain that the settlement of the question must give both parties the capability to adapt to and assimilate the new state of affairs that is shaped.
The international community must avoid the “winner-loser” syndrome in this particular case.
Additionally, the presence of the international community in the region is of particular importance for ensuring stability. Greece has made clear its intention and will to participate actively in this international presence.
Finally, regarding the process in the UN Security Council itself, we consider that engaging Russia is a very critical parameter.
That is the Greek position. This position – with these characteristics and these elements – was set out yesterday during the discussion at the NATO working lunch by the Greek Permanent Representative to NATO, Ambassador Mr. Zeppos.
Mr. Meletis: Please allow me to read you something. Koumoutsakos: “I mentioned a viable solution; that is, it has to be a solution with which both parties can live. So it arises naturally from what I just told you that it has to be a balanced solution based on the logic of a mutual compromise.” Meletis, question: “The solution has to be the result of an agreement between Belgrade and Pristina?”; Koumoutsakos, answer: “Mutual compromise presupposes an agreement.” That’s one, from 14 March. The other. “But it is of great importance and is really vital to peace in the region that the solution be accepted by both sides.” Kostas Karamanlis, 24 January 2007.
When did the Greek government’s position change, because what we heard ten minutes ago from you, a few minutes ago, is totally different from what I just read. When did the Greek government’s position change?
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: First of all, what I stated a short while ago is not at all different from what you read out.
And it is really interesting to look back, because it enables us to confirm today, as well, the intention, the urging expressed by Greece from the outset of the process with firmness and consistency regarding the achievement of an agreed-upon compromise solution.
It was a policy that was followed with utter consistency. There is a process – agreed upon, as you know, by the Contact Group and the international community, which follows the procedural stages.
Throughout these stages, Greece has stressed and urged all of its collocutors, without exception, regarding the need to reach an agreed-upon solution.
This is still Greece’s wish. We believe that in the discussion that will take place on the occasion of the Security Council deliberations there will be addition time so that in the end we can move ahead to a result that will have these characteristics.
I would also like to add here that communication between Athens and Belgrade, as well as between Athens and Pristina, and with other actors – but particularly between Athens and Belgrade – has been constant throughout this time and continues to be so.
As I referred to communication between Greece and Serbia, without linking this in any way to the ongoing process in Kosovo, I want to stress that Greece’s firm position, which will be repeated by the Foreign Ministry at the upcoming Gymnich meeting, is that they must reopen – without delay – the negotiations between Serbia and the European Union on the conclusion of a Stability and Association Agreement between Serbia and the European Union.
Ms. Adam: Mr. Spokesman, the Greek position on Kosovo that has been formulated in recent years is a procedural proposal rather that a substantial one. It says ‘must happen’, ‘we must see’, ‘the two sides must’, ‘the rest of us must do this’, etc. At this time and at yesterday’s NATO working lunch the proposal was clear: acceptance or not of the Ahtisaari proposal, which says – two words all in all – supervised independence for Kosovo.
What stance did the Greek side take within NATO on these very specific two words for Scheffer to say that the 26 members of NATO unanimously support supervised independence for Kosovo? That’s one question.
Second, once again, what do you mean, regarding the process and the intentions of the Greek position to ensure a unified EU position when, apart from Greece, Spain, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Romania, all of the other countries are openly in favour of supervised independence. Who will adapt, where and to whom, to secure a unified position?
And third, as many of us were not in the US, what precisely did Ms. Rice request from Ms. Bakoyannis on the Kosovo issue? That is, when she requested a specific stance on the Kosovo issue, what precisely did she mean?
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: I’ll start with your third question. At the meeting and at all the meetings the Foreign Minister had in Washington, the US side, on all levels, expressed – and briefed us on – the positions of the US government on this particular issue. A particular stance was never requested – demanded, as is often said – from the Greek side.
At all these meetings, the Foreign Minister set out in full the Greek position, which has the characteristics that I set out for you and that we have mentioned on many occasions.
In answer to your first question:. It was not a referendum-style discussion. Neither was yesterday’s discussion within NATO a decision-making process. A yes-or-no issue was not raised regarding the Ahtisaari plan. It was a discussion for exchange of views on the Ahtisaari plan, during which the Greek permanent representative moved strictly along the lines I described to you.
Ms. Adam: I would like to comment, if I might, on the two positions, that is the Greek side at the working luncheon – between courses – on Kosovo, the stance, that is, of the Greek side as you described it to us, and the official statement made by Mr. Scheffer, that the 26 unanimously support the Ahtisaari plan, that is, supervised independence. That is, I can clearly understand that the Greek side did not raise or express any kind of objection to supervised independence for Kosovo as the most probable or already concluded solution for Kosovo.
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: I set out every detail of the Greek position.
Mr. Meletis: I wanted to ask about something you said: that the international community must avoid the winner-loser syndrome. Do you consider that the secession by force of a part of an independent and sovereign country can leave the feeling of a winner? And second, I want to ask whether foreign policy – as I saw that Greece’s wish remains even now that there be agreement – whether and since when foreign policy is exercised with wishes.
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: Foreign policy is exercised through positions, views and urgings to all your collocutors, in an effort to influence things in the direction you support. Greece’s policy – in all its meetings – was to point to the importance, and, in the end, help in the direction, of there being an agreed-upon solution.
The parties themselves, the parties directly involved, were in a negotiation process and could not agree. As you can see, this is not the fault of the Greek side. Neither is there any blame, of course, if the two sides participating couldn’t lead the negotiations to an agreed-upon compromise solution.
So Greece’s position throughout this time was to support that this should be the objective; that this is what should be achieved.
So there is no question of wishes. You try, through your position, through the clarity of your arguments, to lead things in a direction that you think is right. This is what Greece did, in the extreme, constantly and consistently.
Regarding your first question, which has to do with the winner-loser syndrome.
Of course we believe this now as well. That is why we are saying it. Because we know the region. Greece has a profound knowledge of the region and believes that there should not be a feeling of being the winner or the loser – for someone to be humiliated. Of course, this holds true in every case, but particularly in this region of the world, the winner-loser syndrome should not exist, because it is a complex and long-suffering region.
But in your question you referred, in a way, to “imposing a solution by force”, ignoring something that has clearly been included in the Greek position.
We stress that there must be the seal of international legality. That is, for there to be a Security Council resolution. This shows that your reference to “imposing by force” in no way corresponds to the Greek position. The exact opposite is the case. It does not correspond.
Mr. Meletis: (off microphone) . . . we are winners because the Security Council decided – that’s what I’m trying to understand. That’s why I’m asking you.
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: I hope that in this question you are not raising or, in any case, not calling into question or that it is not your intention that the weight of Security Council resolutions be called into doubt – resolutions that exist on a number of issues, including the Cyprus issue.
Mr. Vitalis: What we are trying to do, I think, is ask for further explanation regarding what you noted about the Security Council. You consider that to engage Russia is a critical parameter. We know very well what the Russian side says. What are you saying – accept the demands of the Russian side? The Russian side has certain criticisms – it doesn’t accept this supervised independence thing.
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: We are point out the very important say Russia has as a permanent member of the UN Security Council.
Mr. Vitalis: Excuse me, I just want to understand. Russia raises a specific issue regarding the Ahtisaari plan – a specific issue. Are you listening to Russia or are we saying that what Russia is saying is right or what Ahtisaari is saying is right? One of the two things must be the case.
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: What we are saying is that Russia and its positions are a very important parameter in the process of formulating a UN Security Council resolution.
Mr. Kapoutsis: Mr. Spokesman, do we have an answer or any indication of a forthcoming answer from NATO regarding the Greek positions on the demilitarisation or not of Agios Efstratios?
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: I have nothing new on that, no.
Mr. Kapoutsis: Do you know when we will?
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: No, I can’t predict that.
Mr. Mavridis: Do you believe – I don’t want to infer from the answers you have given so far, but tell me clearly – that this is not the right time for a final solution on the Kosovo issue?
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: Recently, in the Foreign Minister’s interview with the news media team that covered her visit to the US, she pointed out and I quote, “Time is of the essence and we need to step up our efforts. I had the opportunity to present our views on these developments to Ms. Rice, on the particularly sensitive aspects to which we should pay attention, on Serbia’s role, and, in particular, on this new effort that the Serbian government, which is to be formed, is being called upon to make, as well as the timeframe for further discussions; time that is still available, in our view.”
Therefore, the last element of the answer is that we believe that there is still time, and that we must make use of all of this time to achieve the best possible solution.
The criterion for our policy – and I do not need to repeat it continuously – is that the day after will be a day of stability and security for the region.
Mr. Gilson: Mr. Spokesman, you mentioned that the 23 rounds of negotiations between Belgrade and Pristina were fruitless and you also mentioned that the Secretary General has submitted his report to the Security Council, etc.
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: The report was submitted to the Secretary General.
Mr. Gilson: Oh, forgive me, Mr. Ahtisaari has submitted his report to the Secretary General. You mentioned that both sides will have to assimilate new realities. What does this mean exactly, that they will have to accept the Ahtisaari plan?
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: This is a position that we have been mentioning for a long time now. We said at the time that we are pleased to note that there are broad powers and rights provided for all population groups, including Kosovo Serbs. It is an essential element for creating a stable, peaceful, multi-ethnic and multi-cultural society. And also that we concurrently note that these proposals do not include elements of a gradual, step-by-step implementation that would allow for greater adaptation to and better assimilation of a new state of affairs by the parties involved.
Mr. Gilson: You mean that the Serbs will accept the plan as time goes by?
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: I have already answered.
Mr. Gilson: I have another question regarding the Washington part of the visit. We heard of course Mr. Burns’ public statement on the issue of Agios Efstratios. And I want to ask two things on these discussions between Ms. Bakoyannis and Mr. Burns. He said of course that the issue should be resolved through ΝΑΤΟ. Has Mr. Burns expressed an intention on the part of the US State Department to encourage Turkey to move ahead with this exercise? And secondly, whether in discussions with Mr. Burns, and Ms. Rice and Mr. Hadley, there were perhaps discussions, analyses, on the issue of political fluidity in Turkey in view of the presidential and parliamentary elections this autumn and how this influences Greek-Turkish relations.
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: With regard to the topics of the discussions, they have been announced repeatedly in public.
Mr. Gilson: Questions are to clarify public statements.
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: What has been announced still stands.
With regard to your first question on the Burns statement, so that we can avoid any misunderstandings. You mentioned that Mr. Burns said that “the issue should be resolved within NATO”. What he said, in fact, was that this is an issue that NATO is looking into.
Journalist: (off microphone)… but it is obvious that the issue of the exercise will be resolved within NATO.
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: He said that this is an issue that NATO is looking into. He did not say that it should be resolved within ΝΑΤΟ.
Mr. Gilson: I asked you whether Mr. Burns said that he will encourage Turkey to allow this exercise to take place, as Admiral Xenofotis asked.
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: Mr. Burns made this public statement. I’ll stand on the US view that the island of Agios Efstratios is not a demilitarised area.
Mr. Gilson: Could you then answer the second part of my question on how the Americans assess the influence of Turkish domestic politics on Greek-Turkish relations?
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: In short, you are asking me to answer on how another state – let’s say a second state – assesses the domestic politics of a third state. You realise that this is not possible.
Mr. Vitalis: Now that we have come to the issue of the Aegean, Mr. Spokesman, I would like to ask the following: We assume that the Aigaio oceanographic vessel sailed as planned yesterday with a Turkish scientist on board, as you already announced.
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: He sailed along with others, yes.
Mr. Vitalis: A Turkish scientist and others. I would like to ask you the following. From now on, will all research that is carried out by either a Greek or a German or a French vessel include a Turkish scientist on board?
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: The elements that we have made public concern this specific research programme of an international nature, with the participation of universities from many different countries.
Mr. Kottaridis: Two questions. Whether in similar research with Turkish vessels a Greek scientist-researcher will also be on board. And secondly, whether you have a comment to make regarding all the tension in Iran following the detention of 15 British Navy personnel.
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: You realise that every research project has its own specific and exclusive characteristics, for instance an international or national character and so on.
Therefore, every scientific research programme has its own characteristics and it is judged based on these characteristics.
On the issue of Iran. We have been briefed by Great Britain on the detention of 15 British military personnel in Iran. It is a fact that naturally causes particular and strong concern.
Greece expresses the wish and the hope for the speediest possible resolution of this issue, according to rules of international law and implementing standard international practices, particularly with regard to the conditions the detained are being held in and to their liberation.
I would like to take this opportunity to mention here that in such political issues and cases, we see the particular significance of the principle of community solidarity, which of course concerns all member states, with no exceptions, and their relations with other countries.
Mr. Symeonidis: It has been more than a week since Ankara’s verbal note on the issue of the incident over Karpathos and as far as I am aware the Ministry of Defense has not received the complete file on the verbal note from you – to the extent that it concerns the Defense Ministry, because it has certain technical positions. Do you intend to send the complete file on the note regarding the Karpathos incident to the Ministry of Defense? And a second question. Did Ms. Bakoyannis, while she was in the US, perhaps find an opportunity to put forward Greece’s positions to her American collocutors regarding the Limnos issue given the current Agios Efstratios issue?
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: I don’t know the procedure that has been followed regarding the communication of the documents relative to the issue in question, but I think it is self-evident that this communication will take place, if it hasn’t taken place already. I think that this is a self-evident matter of bureaucratic routine.
On your other question. The Foreign Minister briefed her interlocutors comprehensively and fully on Greece’s concerns and positions regarding the course of Greek-Turkish relations.
Your realise that the topical nature and the significance of recent events put them into a more intense light. I am talking about Agios Efstratios. This does not mean that other issues are relegated to a lower level.
Ms. Adam: I want to come back a little to the ships in the Aegean. This time last year, another German-French-Greek research programme started with the vessel Poseidon, which we “lost in the fog”, and ended badly – and we never understood how – with the addition of a Turkish observer on the vessel at that time. A month and a half ago, a French research vessel in the programme with the University of Kiel, went to pick up the cables from the Aegean and the operation went badly due to the reaction of Turkey. And now the Egelados is leaving to pick up . . .
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: : The Aigaio.
Ms. Adam: The Aigaio, or whatever it’s called, with the programme, precisely because we found the golden mean to find a programme being participated in by a Turk present as researcher rather than observer. That is, is this a model that we might be able to implement from now on so as not to have such problems in the Aegean? One.
And the second question has to do with the announcement you issued concerning the Aigaio. I still don’t understand something. You say that the vessel will collect the devices and cable from the Greek continental shelf. How exactly do you define the Greek continental shelf, and, more importantly, how do you define its outer limit, and whether you can give us the course of the vessel so we know what the Greek continental shelf is.
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: I’ll start from the last question. As you can understand, the Foreign Ministry does not issue charts and courses.
Regarding your question on the continental shelf, you are aware that there has not been a treaty delimiting the Greek continental shelf.
The fact that there is no such international agreement on delimitation does not mean that there is not a Greek continental shelf.
Ms. Adam: (off microphone) I didn’t say whether or not there is a Greek continental shelf. How you define it.
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: Based on international law.
Ms. Adam: How is the limit of the Greek continental shelf defined in the announcement.
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: I answered that question.
Ms. Adam: My question is not whether there is a Greek continental shelf. I’m asking how you define it.
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: The Greek continental shelf is defined based on the International Law of the Sea that is in force. That’s the way we see it. The defining of the boundary between the Greek and Turkish continental shelf, as you know, has not taken place because a relevant agreement has not been reached.
As for whether there is a “model” that will be in effect in the future as well, I said that there is the specific research programme, which has a history, content, sources of funding; it has universities that are participating, and it has a specific character. In this regard, what we have announced is in effect, and obviously concerns this particular research programme exclusively.
You also mentioned the distinction between researcher and observer. It is an important distinction. A researcher representing their university is one thing – participating, in any case, from the outset, in a particular research programme – and the capacity of observer is completely different; a representative of a country in a research project being carried out.
Mr. Meletis: As you said that the Greek continental shelf is defined based on the international law of the sea regulations in effect, and that the boundary simply hasn’t been set. I wanted to ask, that is, based on this wording, how far does the continental shelf of Kalolimnos, the Imia islets, Agathonisi, the Fourni islets – how far does the continental shelf extend around these islands?
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: I’ll stand on my initial answer.
Mr. Meletis: Is exclusively Greek research, with a Greek boat and only Greek researchers, carried out on the Greek continental shelf as you define it?
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: I don’t have a specific example, if there is one to give you. I don’t know if this has been the case. But this is obvious.
Ms. Adam: By the same token, do we allow Turkey, which also has a continental shelf and defines its limits however it likes . . .
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: Please be careful. I never said anything like that.
Ms. Adam: . . . – excuse me – to pass through the Aegean wherever it likes?
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: You asked me how the Greek continental shelf is defined. I answered that there is a specific perception regarding the Greek continental shelf, regarding the characteristics that comprise it, based on international law. At the same time, the designation of its boundary is a pending matter.
Journalist: No, because the same holds true for Turkey.
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: I’ve answered the question.
Mr. Gilson: Since this conference is going to be taking place on Rhodes, Mr. Koumoutsakos, on the European Union’s policy on the sea, is the Greek Foreign Ministry considering proposing that the Montego Bay Convention be made compulsory for candidate countries, like Turkey?
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: I set out the particular subjects and headings to be addressed by this meeting on Rhodes.
Mr. Gilson: One minute. Was there any indication of the Secretary General’s intentions regarding the 8 July process and the Cyprus issue?
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: Of course this issue was discussed. That the process must move forward.
Good afternoon.