Athens
, 15 December 2009
Mr. Speaker,
Ladies and Gentlemen MPs,
From the very outset, I said that the current government, the Pasok government, will pursue consensus and dialogue on foreign policy issues. We will utilize all institutions to keep the political parties and the Greek people apprised of major decisions.
Within the week – and, now, following the election of the new leadership of New Democracy – I will ask the parties to designate their representatives to the National Council on Foreign Policy, so that the Council may convene as soon as possible. With the new year, we will also schedule another meeting of the Committee on Defense and Foreign Affairs.
But I also want today’s debate to function as a framework for mature and productive dialogue.
Before I go into the questions you have posed, I want to stress this: We are exercising foreign policy with confidence because we have clear positions and we are serving universal values.
We have confidence – it is incumbent upon us to have confidence – because our positions are just and we can look our collocutors in the eye, whoever they may be.
We will of course listen to anyone who has something useful and productive to say, and we take note of what is said. We are open to ideas, and we make no claim to infallibility. We want to work with all of the political forces in Greece to the benefit of this land. We want to take the country where it deserves to be. We want to take it forward and give it the voice it was unfairly deprived of in recent years.
With regard to Greek-Turkish and Euro-Turkish issues, our positions have always been clear. George Papandreou – the country’s current Prime Minister, with a broad popular mandate – is the basic architect of Greek-Turkish rapprochement. He is the man who put the problems Turkey creates in Greek-Turkish relations into a Community framework.
And I am proud to have worked by his side in shaping this policy since 1999, and to have seen its most important result become a reality: the accession of the Republic of Cyprus to the European Union.
Since then, this policy – charted by the Pasok government – has remained the cornerstone of Greece’s policy on Turkey, without even the previous government’s calling into question its basic principles and framework.
We want to pick up the thread of Greek-Turkish affairs where we left it in 2004.
That is,
· first, to further promote and deepen Greek-Turkish cooperation in those sectors where there is no dispute: from economy and tourism to energy and culture. This policy has benefited Greece – its economy and its people, even in their day-to-day lives – and it will do so again.
· second, to continue the efforts towards improving the climate on a military level and reducing tensions through the adoption of appropriate confidence-building measures, and
· third, to revitalize, in a serious manner, the exploratory contacts on the question of the delimitation of the continental shelf.
The exploratory contacts are not an end in themselves. They are a means to exploring the potential for resolving the legal issue of the delimitation of the continental shelf, and thus they should produce some result within a reasonable space of time.
With regard to the latter issue in particular, I would like to make certain clarifications so that misapprehensions might be avoided.
Our country considers the delimitation of the continental shelf to be the sole legal dispute – one that we are prepared to discuss, as provided for in the Convention on the Law of the Sea.
Should it become clear that a substantive solution on the delimitation of the continental shelf cannot be reached within a reasonable space of time, then the only solution that remains is to refer the matter to international justice; specifically, the International Court in The Hague. And many countries have done this – including European countries – in order to settle such disputes.
Any issues that Turkey may raise in the Aegean are Turkey’s unilateral claims to the detriment of the national sovereignty and sovereign rights of our country, and as such – as I have stressed repeatedly – they are not up for discussion.
We are not discussing any other issues. Period.
And as you raised the issue of the Muslim minority in Thrace, I want to make one thing clear once again: Turkey – or any Turkish official – can say whatever it wants. The government is not discussing Muslim minority issues – issues concerning Greek citizens, that is – with third countries. And for once, listen to what the Greek government is saying to you.
This observation leads me to another major axis of our policy on Turkey: The placing of problems Turkey creates for us into a Community framework, which became a reality in Helsinki, in December 1999.
It was then that Turkey’s respect for good neighbourly relations and the peaceful resolution of disputes with its neighbours – including, should it become necessary, recourse to the International Court in The Hague, with a time horizon of 2004 – was set as a prerequisite for Turkey’s accession course.
In other words, in Helsinki, the settlement of the problems created by Ankara and that plague Greek-Turkish relations was rendered a precondition for the progress of Turkey’s accession course, and in fact a deadline was set for Turkey’s meeting of its accession obligations with regard to these problems.
Unfortunately, this deadline has passed, essentially removing the pressure on Turkey. This is to be answered for. We have spoken repeatedly of great lost opportunities – historic opportunities – that we ourselves created through the policy we exercised.
And five year later, Mr. Karamanlis needs to answer for why he decided to give Turkey the green light – on CNN, no less.
History will judge this, and the first judgement came in the recent elections.
We support out neighbour’s European course, not just as an invaluable tool for resolving problems that Turkey provokes, but also because – in the long view – it serves our interests.
We would rather have our neighbour be a European country, a stable democracy that respects good neighbourly relations, with rule of law that respects human rights, religious freedoms and minorities.
Not a state whose structures and functioning do not come up to European standards.
Our aim is to make constructive use of Turkey’s accession course in order to give our neighbour momentum on the path to reforms and the adoption of conduct that respects good neighbourly relations and European principles and values.
And negotiating each chapter hard, point by point, to gain benefits in our bilateral relations, as well, from Turkey’s process of adaptation.
Turkey will not get a blank check. As we did in the past, this government will once again make respect for good neighbourly relations and the peaceful resolution of disputes prerequisites based on which the progress of our neighbour’s accession course will be judged and evaluated.
We will continue to move in this direction, bringing the problems Turkey creates for us to the international stage and insisting on Ankara’s compliance with international law and the principles of the UN Charter.
Last week – and despite the inadequate preparation of the previous government – we managed to put some things back in their proper perspective.
Our efforts are starting to bear fruit, as set down in the conclusions of the latest General Affairs Council.
We are just starting out, and we still have much work before us so that we can make up for lost time.
We are picking up the thread again in a very different international state of affairs, and it will take an even greater effort to reformulate the right framework for achieving our goals.
But we are confident. We have a plan, experience and the certainty that we will succeed.
The issue of the name of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia – our “National Red Line” – is an achievement that we must safeguard, because it is also our negotiating strength. Pasok formulated this “Red Line”, and the vast majority of the political forces stood with us in the Hellenic Parliament. We accept a name with a geographical qualifier for use in relation to everyone and in all instances – erga omnes.
This position of ours led to the self-evident decision in Bucharest. This position made it clear to the international community that Greece is fighting justly for its historical and cultural heritage and is resisting the effort being made to usurp this heritage.
In the European Union, the Council decided that the resolution of the issue is necessary and essential in order for Skopje to take further steps on its accession course.
Last week, we postponed the consideration of the matter of accession negotiations being opened with Skopje until halfway through the next Presidency, despite the current Presidency’s ardent attempts to create a fictitious image of Skopje and force the opening of accession negotiations.
In a positive voice, with tangible initiatives and active diplomacy, Greece showed all of its partners that it is the motor force behind the accession perspective of the Balkans. Our “Agenda 2014” proposal is re-imparting momentum the European perspectives of the region.
At the same time, in dynamic initiatives, the Prime Minister met twice with the Prime Minister of FYROM, proving to all the world that Greece is prepared to find a mutually acceptable solution. But the negotiation framework is not changing. We have said this many times, and I will never tire of repeating it.
The negotiations are taking place within the framework or the UN, based on the relevant Security Council resolutions. But direct meetings – even on the level of Prime Ministers – can impart positive momentum.
These meeting can be of benefit, and – in any case – Greece, with its strong arguments and its clear positions, Greece, with its clear “National Red Line”, has nothing to fear. We do not shy away from such meetings – we are pursuing them.
The Council’s conclusions were accepted with reservations in Skopje. The FYROM leadership appears to have chosen to create an environment of entrenchment and siege, once again stimulating nationalistic reflexes. That is not our message.
Greece can and wants to promote Skopje’s accession, but a precondition for this is the prior resolution of the name issue. Mr. Gruevski holds the future of his country in his hands. He can become the leader who secured a European future. Or he can go down in history as the man who held his country back from the realization of its European integration, turning it to the nationalism of the Balkan past.
Right now, Mr. Gruevski still holds the key. But in the end, the moment will come when the people judge and assess.
We also aim to address the neighbouring people to make them understand that Greece and the Greek people have a vision of a common future of peace and security within the framework of the European family.
I will close with the major issue of our foreign policy, which is also one of the great injustices that must be redressed in Europe.
The Cyprus issue is an issue of the invasion and military occupation of the territory of an EU member state by a state that is a candidate for membership. It is a matter of the military occupation of the territory of one UN member by another. The Cyprus issue is one of shame before European principles, and it points up the distortion of an international system that tolerates the perpetuation of this state of affairs.
President Demetris Christofias has undertaken a bold initiative, and the negotiations under the UN are in progress. Greece supports the process, making it clear that this must be a Cypriot process – that it must provide a Cypriot solution. There is no room for artificial timeframes, mediation, intimidation and threats of partitioning.
I stressed this in my statement at the latest Council of Foreign Ministers, facing down the attacks, even the threats, of some partners. A just, viable and functional solution within the framework of the UN and fully respecting the Community acquis. A solution of a bizonal, bicommunal federation. A solution that will allow the Cypriot people as a whole – Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots alike – to enjoy the benefits of participation in the European family, in the security that this family offers. A solution that will free Cyprus from the outdated system of guarantees and will eradicate once and for all the colonial vestiges of the past.
Last week, Greece and Cyprus fought a tough diplomatic battle together in a not-so-friendly environment. It was a difficult battle, but we are satisfied at the fact that the position we adopted was clear and categorical; it was a common position – Greece and Cyprus with a single, unified voice.
We said that Ankara bears full responsibility for the non-fulfilment of its accession obligations to Cyprus and the perpetuation of the sanctions: the freezing of eight chapters. Many countries – led by Sweden and the UK – blocked, in every way, the imposition of collective, additional sanctions. Greece and Cyprus, together with a few other countries, made it clear that we need – for the sake of the Union’s credibility – to take a clear stance. With the full support of Greece, Cyprus proceeded to the unilateral freezing of additional chapters.
In any case, it is clear that Turkey’s accession course will not come to completion if Ankara does not recognize the Republic of Cyprus and normalize its relations with the Republic of Cyprus. And, of course, if the Cyprus issue is not resolved. The Republic of Cyprus – and this is now understood by everyone – is in a position of power; a position it has gained thanks to its membership in the EU.
We are being called upon to exercise foreign policy in a difficult environment; an environment that is fluid and demanding. Following a period of general inertia during the term of the Karamanlis government. We are following a dynamic foreign policy; aggressive, with initiatives, intelligent. We are reversing the situation, and we are not afraid to consider new ideas and approaches. We have an open mind. And we are not avoiding contact with anyone, should that contact be in our country’ interest.
We want to have consensus with the country’s political forces, and we will not hesitate to adopt the ideas and proposals of others if those proposals are good and serve the objectives of our homeland. Above all, however, we are determined to throw off the timorous foreign policy that limits Greece’s horizons. We have confidence. We have a vision. We have objectives. Greece deserves this. The women and men of Greece deserve this. And we have the way and the means – the strength – to make this a reality. And we want all of the country’s forces together with us in this effort.
Thank you.