Athens, 13 September 2006
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: Good morning.
As I have already informed you, tomorrow the Foreign Minister is travelling to Belgrade and Pristina before going to Brussels, where she will participate in the proceedings of the EU General Affairs and External Relations Council.
The programme for the visit to Belgrade, which is the first stop on her visit: she is to meet with Serbian President Mr. Tadic, and Prime Minister Mr. Kostunica. She will travel to Pristina in the afternoon and is to meet in Pristina, at 15:00, with the president of Kosovo, Mr. Sejdiu, the President of the Parliament, the head of the Serbian list, Mr. Ivanovic, the president of the opposition party, PDK, Mr. Hashim Thaci, the head of the ORA party, Mr. Veton Surroi, and of course with the UN Secretary General's special representative for Kosovo, Mr. Rucker. After this meeting the Minister will hold a press conference and will then depart for Brussels.
With regard to the agenda for the GAERC, no special discussion is set for the General Affairs section. In the External Relations section there will be a discussion of developments in the Western Balkans, with emphasis on developments in Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina, Sudan and the case of Darfur and the worsening of the situation there, developments in Congo, on the issue of which there will be a briefing from Mr. Solana.
Regarding other issues during the proceedings of the Council, following a Greek request, relations between the European Union and the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) will be discussed. During the foreign ministers' luncheon there is to be a discussion of issues regarding developments in Iran, the Middle East in general and Iraq.
The discussion on the Middle East will be a continuation of the discussions that were held during the recent informal Meeting of Foreign Ministers, the Gymnich meeting, which was held in Finland.
Regarding Foreign Minister Ms. Bakoyannis’ participation in the 61st UN General Assembly and her programme during her stay in New York and Washington, I have some additional items to announce. With regard to bilateral contacts, Ms. Bakoyannis is to have the following meetings:
On Monday, 18 September, she will meet at Greece's Permanent Mission with Turkish Foreign Minister Mr. Gul. Let me remind you here that this is the practice that has been followed in the last three years -- for there to be a meeting of the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers, alternating between the offices of the Permanent Missions of the two countries.
On 19 September, Ms. Bakoyannis will meet with the Foreign Minister of Egypt, Mr. Ahmed Ali Aboul Gheit, and the Foreign Minister of Iran, Mr. Manuchehr Motaki.
On 20 September, the Foreign Minister will meet with her Spanish counterpart, Mr. Miguel Angel Moratinos.
On 21 September, Ms. Bakoyannis will meet with the Foreign Minister of Syria, Mr. Walid al-Mualem. On Friday, 22 September, Ms. Bakoyannis will meet with the Secretary General's special representative for Kosovo, Mr. Ahtisaari.
Other bilateral meetings are being set up and will be announced to you as they are finalised.
Regarding the rest of the Minister's programme in New York, on Tuesday, 19 September, Ms. Bakoyannis will participate in the coordinating meeting of EU Foreign Ministers, and will then meet with the delegation from the Hellenic Parliament that will be observing the proceedings of the General Assembly. At 12:30, local time, Ms. Bakoyannis will address the opening of the "In Praise of the Olive" exhibition, and on the evening of the same day she will attend the reception hosted each year by the US President for participating heads of delegations.
On Wednesday, 20 September, Ms. Bakoyannis will chair the thematic debate in the Security Council -- the debate being held on the initiative of the Greek Presidency. I gave you information on this debate at our previous meeting. Afterwards the Foreign Minister will host a luncheon for the members of the Security Council, on the occasion of the Greek Presidency.
On the following day, Thursday, 21 September, Ms. Bakoyannis will participate in the meeting of Foreign Ministers of NATO member states, and afterwards will speak on Greek foreign policy at the outset of the 21st century, at a conference being organized by the Foreign Policy Association. In the evening, Ms. Bakoyannis will participate in the dinner being hosted by the French Foreign Minister for Francophony member states.
On the morning of Friday, 22 September, there will be a of the UN and regional organizations, which will be participated in, of course, by the Greek Minister, in her capacity as President of the Security Council.
Ms. Bakoyannis will then participate in a meeting between EU Foreign Ministers and Russia, which will take place at the offices of the EU Council in New York, as well as a meeting EU-US Foreign Ministers. Also scheduled is a “trans-Atlantic” working luncheon hosted by US Secretary of State Ms. Rice.
On the afternoon of the same day, Ms. Bakoyannis will address the plenary session of the General Assembly. I also note that, following a Greek initiative, there will be a meeting at the offices of the Greek Permanent Mission of SEECP foreign ministers with Mr. Ahtisaari.
Finally, on Saturday 23 September, Ms. Bakoyannis will attend the luncheon being hosted by the Russian Foreign Minister for the member states of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC).
Ms. Bakoyannis' programme in Washington will follow. I have already given this to you and have nothing new to add.
Regarding the programmes of the Deputy Foreign Ministers, on Thursday, 14 September, Mr. Valinakis will address the joint meeting of the ad hoc International Law Committee of the Council of Europe and the International Criminal Court, which will take place at Zappeion. He will then travel to New York, where he will represent Greece at a series of multilateral meetings.
On Wednesday, 13 September, Mr. Stylianidis will meet, at 17:00, at the Foreign Ministry, with the US Ambassador. On Thursday, 14 September, he will address the 1st Arab-Hellenic Economic Forum, at Zappeion. And finally, on Monday, 18 September, he will accompany the President of the Republic, Mr. K. Papoulias, on a state visit to Germany. This visit will last through 22 September.
Your questions, please.
Mr. Meletis: I would like to ask something about the Balkan issues. Yesterday, I read some statements Mr. Christidis made in Sofia, that the solution to the general problem in the region will be the accession of Serbia and Kosovo to the European Union. I would like to ask whether this is the position of the Foreign Ministry, and under what conditions Kosovo’s accession to the EU would take place. Second: whether the positive stance taken by the EU and Greece, among others, on the referendum in Montenegro means that the same holds true and the same stance will be taken regarding the Serb-Bosnian entity in Bosnia, which has recently – from what I have read of officials’ statements – requested and is discussing cessation from Bosnia.
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: I’ll start with the last question. The discussion taking place in Bosnia has only just begun. So a position cannot be taken by the Foreign Ministry on a possible, uncertain development.
Regarding Ambassador Christidis’ statement, I would like to remind you of the general position of Greece’s foreign policy, which, of course, remains firm. The course and approach of the region of Southeast Europe – the Western Balkans – toward the European Union is, in our view, and can be, a catalyst for peace in the whole region.
With regard to Serbia in particular, our country has repeatedly been the country in the EU that has mainly underlined to our other partners the need to ensure for Serbia a smooth course of approach to European and Euro-Atlantic institutions – provided Serbia is interested in this approach.
This is a firm pursuit and position of Greece. Many member states have converged, if not agreed, with regard to this position, and this is the point of reference for our position within the framework of the European Union, concerning this particular issue.
Ms. Adam: Given that Bulgaria and Romania are currently facing huge problems, and we don't know what the extent of their adaptation will be when they enter the European Union, and that within the European Union itself the discussion is coming to a head as to whether Turkey will be excluded or gain a special relationship or, in any case, won't become a member of the European Union, how does this general position relate to the reality of the situation?
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: This position of ours is both related to the reality of the situation and completely realistic. In the sense that for all the states of the Balkans, you specifically mentioned Bulgaria and Romania ...
Ms. Adam: For example.
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: These countries are making an effort. That this effort is being made, with the incentive and objective, for them, being full accession to the European Union, everyone sees this as having brought positive results for the development and political stability and democracy of these countries.
Certain steps are being taken in this final stage before accession. There are certain things that still have to be done. This, precisely, is the positive side. This is the positive result of the efforts of countries who are truly interested in approaching the European Union.
As you expressed an interest in the reality of the situation and to what extent the Greek position corresponds to reality, no one can ignore that the countries of the Western Balkans, it one way or another, have various frameworks of association with and approach to the European Union I remind you of the Stabilization and Association Pacts concluded recently by Albania and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and others who are currently negotiating such agreements.
So the course of the region toward Europe -- with the stages, the difficulties and challenges that arise -- is a reality that cannot be ignored by Greece, but is instead strengthened and encouraged.
Moreover, this is a result of a policy that arises from the Thessaloniki declaration, at the closing of the Greek Presidency of 2003. Since then, this policy has been reaffirmed and worked out in greater detail by Greece. It is an effort on the part of our country that, I think, has been met positively in all the countries of the region.
You also raised the issue of the enlargements and how for these can go, referring in particular to case of Turkey's effort to accede.
I think that we've taken a stance on this, that the Greek government has taken a stance on all levels, repeatedly, there's nothing new for us to add there.
Let me just remind you that Foreign Minister Ms. Bakoyannis, in her statements yesterday, spoke clearly of the strong concern developing in many European capitals, precisely due to an unsatisfactory rate and degree of compliance on the part of Turkey with commitments it has undertaken.
Beyond that, we have before us various stages, of which you are aware. There is the upcoming submission of the European Commission's report. Everyone expects that it will be a text that will specify and shape a specific atmosphere for the course of Turkey's candidacy. Greece -- and I can be categorical regarding this -- is doing what it believes is most effective so that the commitments are honored, and so that Turkey, through satisfying and complying with these commitments, will be able to ensure a smooth European course.
We have said before that only the fulfillment of commitments and compliance with commitments can be considered a safe route for Turkey's European course. Anything else is an uncertain way to approach the European family.
Mr. Bourdaras: Mr. Spokesman, a high-ranking officer of the Turkish armed forces recently said that the report on the latest tragic accident -- in which the life of the Greek pilot was lost in the Aegean -- has been completed, and it is now an issue for the Turkish Foreign Ministry to handle. In view of Ms. Bakoyannis' meeting with Mr. Gul, has Ms. Bakoyannis requested the Greek report -- and if so, what does contain -- so that she can discuss it with the Turkish Minister.
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: I don't know whether it will be a subject of discussion at the meeting of the two Foreign Ministers. Regarding the Greek report, I am not aware of whether it has been completed. I consider it a certainty that if a report has been completed, it will be given to the Foreign Minister. It is not an issue of its being requested from the Defense Ministry.
It is a report that I think will be announced in due course.
Mr. Kourbela: … particularly the issue of illegal migration. As there have been some developments, I would like you to answer certain questions. First, the President of the European Commission has sent a letter to Mr. Karamanlis asking for his help in confronting the issue of illegal migration ahead of the Informal Summit Meeting set for October, at which they will discuss this issue, which they have blown up into a very large issue. Second, I want to ask you whether Egypt has answered in the affirmative to a Greek request for the signing of an agreement on the readmission of illegal immigrants, as you said that the Minister will meet with the Egyptian Minister. The third is whether, following Frattini's visit to Athens, specific initiatives have been taken for cooperation in the Mediterranean, etc. Thank you.
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: As you know, the handling of the problem of illegal migration is an issue of intense concern to the whole of the European Union. Of course, it is of particular concern to our country, which, in a way, is a border -- a gate of entry -- to the space of the member states of the European Union. Greece has long sea borders, and for this reason the effectiveness of the measures taken by Greece to confront this phenomenon are of particular importance to the European Union. This is precisely what has been stressed repeatedly by the Greek government at all the relevant discussions that have taken place within the framework of cooperation with the European partners.
With regard to the specific request made to the Prime Minister, I have nothing more to add beyond the fact that -- as far as I can know, given that this is not the exclusive competency or the competency of the Foreign Ministry -- new efforts are already being made and being planned for the more effective handling of illegal migration.
You also referred to the readmission agreement with Egypt. At this time I cannot know how this issue is evolving.
Regarding cooperation with the Mediterranean member states of the Union, let me remind you that for a year now the cooperation of the seven Mediterranean countries of the EU, on a Greek initiative, has been strengthened on many levels. One of the sectors of cooperation is the confronting of illegal migration. Also still on the table is the Greek initiative regarding the forming of a European Coast Guard.
Mr. Kalarrytis: Is the Greek government satisfied with the situation of the Greek minority? Whether it's assessment is that progress has been made and it is satisfied, and whether during the visit of the Albanian Prime Minister the issue of Greek cemeteries will be raised. Thank you.
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: it would be unfair of us to say that progress has not been made in the situation of the Greek national minority in Albania. Progress has been made. But this does not mean that the whole distance has been covered by our neighboring country, so that the Greek national minority has all the potential and opportunities, so that it can continue, in security, to make progress and develop as one of the component parts of Albanian society.
We have repeatedly said that the Greek national minority must be considered as -- and it is -- a bridge of friendship between the two peoples. We consider it as such. Beyond that, however, our neighboring country has taken up the challenge of approaching and, in the end, acceding to the EU. This means that it will have two comply with all the standards that exists for the respecting of human and minority rights in European rule of law.
With regard to the last issue you raised, within the framework of the military-defense cooperation of the two countries, there is a chapter that concerns precisely the issue that you raised. A few months ago, there was a discussion on the level of experts between the two countries. I can say that the discussion regarding the military cemeteries for Greeks who died on Albanian territory has moved ahead substantially. It has not been completed. It is a pending issue, but real, substantial steps of progress have been made toward the finalization of this agreement.
Mr. Fourlis: As I see it, and correct me if I'm wrong, Greece must have already submitted its views or some written memorandum to the EU with regard to the Commission's report of 26 October. I want to know whether you can tell us something more about this. That is, what is the Greek view or what is the Greek recommendation -- if there is such a recommendation.
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: I can assure you that the European Commission is fully aware of Greece's thoughts and concerns -- Greece being a member of the Union -- regarding our neighboring country's course so far in complying with the prerequisites and the commitments it has undertaken to the EU. Beyond that, you can see that I cannot and should not go into greater detail regarding the content of our reaction in the final stages of the formulation of this report from the European Commission.
Mr. Symeonidis: In your written statement on the "moratorium" yesterday, you said that the "moratorium" concerns the conduct of exercises. Given that the Papoulias-Yilmaz agreement of 1988 states explicitly that the "moratorium" concerns the conduct and planning of exercises, I would like to ask whether something has changed in the Gul-Bakoyannis agreement. And a second question: You spoke yesterday of a Turkish attempt to block the region. Do you have any indication that Turkey cancelled the NOTAM and unblocked the region for air and shipping traffic?
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: With regard to the contents of the Yilmaz-Papoulias Memorandum, it is obvious that nothing has altered with regard to the content of that Memorandum, which remains, if you will, a point of reference for Greek-Turkish relations and the efforts being made to develop a climate that is as good as possible, with the smallest degree of tensions and crises. So it is fully in effect.
Regarding your specific question, I will refer you once again to my answer of yesterday, which holds true, word for word. The summer "moratorium" is one of the elements of the Yilmaz-Papoulias Memorandum, and refers to a specific time during which exercises must not be carried out. When we speak of a summer "moratorium", we are referring to this point in the Yilmaz-Papoulias Memorandum.
Regarding your question on the attempt, it was in fact an attempt, in the sense that, as I also said in yesterday's answer, there was a reaction from the Greek side. So when one position is answered by another, which is contrary, you can see that it remains and, in any case, is taken as an attempt.
Mr. Symeonidis: So the Turkish NOTAM was cancelled? Planes can fly and ships can sail in the region? It was cancelled? It is a safe area?
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: I've answered your question.
Mr. Symeonidis: And you contradicted yourself before. You said that yesterday's statement is valid word for word, but that in the Papoulias-Yilmaz agreement there is the planning of the exercise.
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: There is no contradiction in my answer. The summer "moratorium" -- the respecting, or not respecting, of which has been addressed repeatedly in our briefings -- has not been violated, because the summer "moratorium", which concerns a specific time period, concerns the conduct of exercises at a specific time.
Mr. Symeonidis: But I'm telling you that the Papoulias-Yilmaz Memorandum refers to planning, as well.
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: I've answered your question.
Mr. Symeonidis: So I'm wrong -- there is no planning.
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: I have answered your question in full. I'm not saying you have made a mistake. I said that I have answered your question.
Ms. Adam: How does the government interpret the fact that our neighboring country, on the day after the signing of the extension of the moratorium, blocked an area to carry out an exercise from July to September? That is, this area, which includes international and national space, has remained blocked for three months now. That is, no ship or airplane has approached for three months. This is what Turkey has done. At this time, it has blocked an area that is just sitting there. And I ask: did the Turkish government, following the explanations and demarches of Greece, suspend the NOTAM blocking the region? And did the Greek services issue a new NOTAM saying that this region is no longer blocked? I'm asking two simple things, and when did all this happen?
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: Ms. Adam, you asked me what the view of the Greek government is. There is no issue of a view. There is a specific answer and specific actions that clearly arise from my answer.
Ms. Adam: Which has not concerned itself.
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: Ms. Adam, I know you are extremely observant and hard-working. In my answer I talk about an attempted block, which I characterize as illegal and against regulations. So there is an official position of the Greek government. The attempted block is characterized as illegal and against regulations by the Foreign Ministry. It is also added that actions have been taken by the Civil Aviation Authority in accordance with the standing instructions given by the competent interministerial committee. So it is not a question of comment, but of a specific reaction and stance.
Ms. Adam: This has been added, I assume, to the long list of concerns of the Greek government that have been submitted to the European Commission regarding good neighbourly relations etc., leading up to the October report.
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: Ms. Adam, rest easy. The Greek government is doing everything it should to enter into the record those things that should be entered into the record. I think we have exhausted this issue, and I have nothing further to add.
Mr. Symeonidis: I didn’t understand one thing. Can planes fly, and ships sail, in this region during this period?
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: For more specific, technical questions, I would ask you – I know you also cover this sector – to address your questions to the Defence Ministry. These are technical questions that are not at the core of the Foreign Ministry’s competencies.
Mr. Fourlis: Are you in a position to make an overall assessment of this past year concerning the moratorium’s implementation in Greece and Turkey?
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: Two days before its expiry, I would avoid making such an assessment for formal reasons. I could very well do that as of next week. Mr. Fourlis.
Mr. Santamouris: As I have no knowledge of the first briefing on the Foreign Minister’s meetings in the United States, will she meet FYROM officials or the mediator about the name of the country and should we expect a specific outcome of these meetings? And a second question; has Greece granted a year of diplomatic consultations, a year of smooth continuation of the accession negotiations to Turkey? Thank you.
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: Would you kindly clarify the second part of your question?
Mr. Santamouris: Whether, during the diplomatic consultations in the European Union on the future of Turkey’s accession negotiations and the completion of the Commission’s report, Greece has granted a year of smooth continuation for these negotiations.
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: All the positions of Greece convey one message and one stance alone: Implementation of commitments which have been undertaken vis-à-vis the European Union, based on the texts that have been agreed upon by the European Union.
Mr. Santamouris: Based on the existing texts by the EU on Turkey’s accession negotiations, is it open to question whether there is a possibility for the extension, of the non-imposing, shall we say, of sanctions resulting from Turkey’s non-compliance for one year?
Mr G. Koumoutsakos: You understand that the position which I have mentioned and which you already know is not subject to – and does not require – interpretation. It is clear.
As to your first question, not all the bilateral meetings of the Foreign Minister have been set. I cannot answer your question. I cannot rule out such meetings, but I am not at all certain that they will be carried out, either.
Mr. Santamouris: But I have posed the question whether we should await, on the occasion of all these contacts on the margins of the General Assembly, a new proposal on the name of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: My answer to that is identical to the answer I have given at other times when I was asked to comment on it.
Mr. Nimetz’s mandate is still in force. In the framework of the current mandate, I cannot know what Mr. Nimetz’s actions will be. But the mandate is valid, and it is being carried out.
Mr. Polatos: On the occasion of NATO’s document, in which it is allegedly mentioned that Lemnos is a “demilitarised zone” and that it should not be included in the funding or the planning of NATO exercises, and the actions taken by Mr. Zeppos. Have these actions and demarches of his borne any results? The Greek Government considers it as non-existent. Is there anything more than that? Because NATO has 26 members. If one member considers it non-existent, the remaining 25 have not yet positioned themselves. What has happened in essence on this? Has NATO taken it back and where do we stand on this issue.
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: First of all, let me remind you that there has been a response not only at the level of the Permanent Representative, but at the level of the Chief of Staff, Mr. Xenofotis. There has been an unequivocal, direct and clear letter on this issue, where what you referred to is indeed stated, i.e. that Greece considers this document to be non-existent.
The Alliance, as you know, makes decisions by unanimity. This is the general rule. And in any case, when such a document exists, like the one you have mentioned, and there is such a categorical reply on the part of the interested member state, then I think this is the safe way to address the problem.
Mr. Kapoutsis: Mr. Spokesman, you said that with a view to the submission at the end of October by the European Commission of the progress report on Turkey’s progress, and you said it twice and emphatically, that Greece is doing all it can, so that Turkey may fulfil…
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: I didn’t say what it can, I said what it must do.
Mr. Kapoutsis: … the first time, when you answered Ms. Adam’s question you said what it can. I have noted it and you stressed it. But if you wish that we use the word must, then what it must. There is a difference there, but anyway, you’ve used both.
My question is as follows. Because I do not see what the Greek Government is doing so that turkey complies to its European obligations, can you give us an example – 1, 2, 3 or 5 or 10, as many as you want – of what Greece is doing so that Turkey will fulfil its European obligations? Specific things that Greece has done or is doing.
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: Let me start with the “can” and the “must”. Let’s use “what is required”.
There are always a number of diplomatic actions and stances that must be made public at the right time in order to be effective. You are aware of this. It is my hope that, with your experience in covering Foreign Ministry issues, you understand this fully. The public stances that have been taken at the highest level by the country’s political leadership have both substance and content. They are indicative of the other actions that are taken and that, as I said, are disclosed at the appropriate time – when it is useful for them to be made public.
Mr. Meletis: Mr. Spokesman, you said that the Foreign Minister will meet Mr. Gul on 18/9. a month before the European Commission’s report. In view of which we are doing all we can, must and all that is required so that Turkey’s negative stance towards Greece, but also against the fulfilling of its obligations is noted. What is the message that the Foreign Minister wants to convey through this meeting to the Commission and everyone else?
Mr G. Koumoutsakos