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                                                                                                                                      Athens, 14 April 2008

Stabilising Southeast Europe: Successes and Problems– the view from Greece 

Your Excellencies,

Distinguished Guests,

Ladies and Gentlemen, 

I would like to warmly thank the Institute of European Affairs and in particular Mr. Brendan Halligan and Ms. Jill Donoghue for their kind invitation to join you today. It is a pleasure and an honour to present you with Greece’s views and thoughts on the current situation and of the possible future developments in Southeast Europe, an area we all acknowledge as being of great geostrategic importance.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

The situation in the Balkans is two- dimensional. In part of the Balkans, much progress has been achieved; in others, serious problems still remain: Kosovo, its repercussions on the prospects of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the dispute between Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Serbia’s European future.

Success stories and problems coexist in the Balkans. One notices that three of its countries, Bulgaria, Romania and Slovenia, are already member states of the European Union and of NATO. Furthermore, NATO has recently accepted Albania and Croatia, offering these countries the privileges of a historically strong and stable political and military alliance. Croatia, as you know, is also progressing well in its accession negotiations with the EU.

These developments demonstrate the progress achieved in the region. The EU and NATO have managed, through well-focused policies, to encourage political, economic and social reforms in many of the countries of the Balkan Peninsula.

Today, a large part of Southeast Europe already constitutes a zone of stability and of increasing prosperity. Yet, we still have to deal with the problems of what I call “the corridor of potential instability”. That is the line of countries from Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina to the North, all the way down to Kosovo and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in the South.

Dear friends,

All of us in this room would be delighted to see the remaining problems in Southeast Europe resolved and to ensure that past explosive situations will never be repeated. It is certainly no coincidence that we already have a stability arch comprising several Balkan countries. We, therefore, need to face the problems in this “corridor of instability”; problems of great importance that need to be dealt with accordingly. 

Our method should be clear: repeat success stories where possible; innovate where necessary.

In this framework, the Greek Foreign Minister Dora Bakoyannis presented to the European Union, this last December, a Greek five-point initiative, focusing exactly on the problems of the Western Balkans. I will speak about this later on.

Let us now see the situation in some detail. Significant successes have been scored in the last decade in what I described as the “arch of stability”. Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania are now full members of both NATO and the EU, enjoying social and political stability. Moreover, their economic progress is paramount. Slovenia, in particular, already enjoys a high GNP per capita and is currently presiding over the European Union.

Croatia, also, experiences a similar social, economic and political progress. A few days ago, it was invited, with Albania, to become a member of NATO and it is an exemplary candidate for the European Union. It currently negotiates sixteen chapters of the negotiation framework while Turkey just five. We believe that Croatia can act as a pilot for other countries wishing to join the EU. Last, but not least, the country was elected as a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council for the period 2008-2009.

Greece herself enjoys, for the first time, land frontiers with the EU. My country, which happens to be the strongest economy and the oldest democracy in the region, as well as an old NATO and EU member state, has played a pivotal role in promoting the Euro-Atlantic perspective of Southeast Europe. Now, happily, the whole area from the Danube to the Aegean Sea is a unified political and economic area, enjoying the benefits of Euro-Atlantic integration.

Between the two areas, lie Albania and Montenegro. We are pleased to see Albania getting her invitation to join NATO. The Albanian government continues the promotion of social, political and financial reforms. On the other hand, Albania needs to implement policies for the protection of human and minority rights and to combat corruption. Montenegro has separated itself from Serbia through peaceful means and its government is working on its Euro-Atlantic perspective. In 2006, the country joined the NATO Partnership for Peace Programme, and, in 2007, it signed the Stabilization and Association Agreement with the European Communities. By and large, these two countries can also be described as roughly belonging to the “arch of stability”.

Furthermore, Greece strongly supports Serbia’s European perspective. The country’s progress towards the EU, including its candidate status, must be accelerated. In this context, and in view of the upcoming extraordinary parliamentary elections in the country on the 11th of May, we need to send an encouraging message to the people of Serbia and, in particular to its pro-European forces. The implementation of measures such as visa liberalisation, scholarships, economic and financial assistance etc, will have a tangible impact on the lives of the Serbian people. 

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Let us now take a look at the problem areas of the Balkan Peninsula, or what I describe as the “corridor of Instability”. 

Kosovo is naturally the key for the stability of the Western Balkans. In 1999, it became effectively, if not a Western a UN protectorate. Still, problems remained: crime, human and drug trafficking, money laundering and illicit arms sales, sometimes became an inextricable part of everyday life.

On the 17th of February the Kosovo Assembly, as we all know, declared the province’s independence from Serbia. Though its independence has been recognized by more that 30 countries by now, the situation on the ground remains critical, the Serb minority is turbulent and Kosovo’s international acceptance is still a line of division between major powers as well as within the EU. Indeed, on March 18th, the United Nations police stormed a courthouse that had been seized by Kosovo Serbs in the north of the divided city of Mitrovica. The scenes that followed reminded us of the nineties.

After the unilateral declaration of independence, Kosovo pledged to stick to the Ahtisaari Plan, which means that its Serb-populated areas would enjoy extensive autonomy. This has not happened. On the other hand, the UN mission present in the province on the basis of UN Security Council Resolution 1244, since 1999, is supposed to be replaced after 120 days by two new EU missions. Yet, Resolution 1244 is widely questioned, most recently by Spain, which refused to deploy forces, as the legal basis for these missions.

It is well known that Serbia insists that Kosovo must remain Serbian for ever. Russia backs this stance. Recently, the ex-Prime Minister Gevgeni Primakov declared that future clashes in the region can be avoided by dividing Kosovo. The USA recognized Kosovo, leading Serbia to recall its Ambassador in protest. Greece has had specific reservations for Prishtina’s decision, regarding regional longstanding stability and we will determine our final position taking into account all important parameters of the problem.

But let us not forget the major challenge we face: the unilateral independence of Kosovo could cause spill-over effects not only throughout the Balkans, but in other regions of conflicts around the world.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Bosnia-Herzegovina’s Euro-Atlantic perspective gained a new impetus after December 2007, when the Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the European Communities was initialed.

There were questions whether the recent developments in Kosovo would fuel the rise of Serbian nationalism in that country; yet the situation seems tranquil on the whole. Still: we have to be extremely careful in our policy vis-à-vis that country, which is central to Balkan stability, and not take its present peaceful condition as granted, given its fragile ethnic internal balances.

Last, but not least, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia has also achieved political and economic progress, but the application of the Ohrid Framework Agreement remains difficult. In addition, reforms have been undertaken rather to please international actors than as a result of genuine political will. One month ago, there was a severe political crisis in Skopje, between the ruling party and its Albanian partner, which decided to temporarily leave the governmental coalition. 

Greece supports the FYROM’s political and economic development. Over one billion euros have been invested by Greek companies, contributing to the creation of an estimated 25,000 new jobs. Another 75 million euros in direct Greek aid have been allotted to the country and will be spent mostly for the reconstruction of its basic North-South motorway. The list of economic transactions is long and I will certainly not attempt to exhaust it.

Greece’s commitment to this new democracy is thus evident. We support its membership to the Euro-Atlantic institutions, because we strongly believe that this is the only way to secure longstanding stability and prosperity in the region. This correlates with our overall strategy for Southeast Europe. But any country wishing to become a fully-fledged member of the Euro-Atlantic organizations, should respect the principles of international law and of good neighbourly relations. If FYROM continues to violate these principles, it itself jeopardizes its integration to the Euro-Atlantic structures.

The name problem, of which you hear so much in the media, is but the tip of the iceberg, concealing issues of much greater importance.

Let me try to explain.

In 1944, Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia changed the name of his country’s southern province, the present FYROM from Vardarska to “People’s” and later on “Socialist Republic of Macedonia”. At that time, Greece was ravaged by civil war. Stalin and Tito wanted to take advantage of this tragic situation, in order to secure the eastern block’s access to the Aegean Sea. They thus put forward the idea of a greater Macedonia. The name “Republic of Macedonia” was closely linked to a major plan for taking over a part of Greek territory, that is Greek Macedonia, a land with an indisputable Greek identity for more than 3,000 years.

In so doing, the two dictators, via the creation of a “Macedonian” identity for what is today our neighbouring country, started describing the northern part of Greece – our country’s largest region, Macedonia – as an “occupied” area of “Macedonian brothers” who simply await their “liberation” from Greek rule. This is why Greece’s official position back in the nineties was that the name of this country should never include the term “Macedonia”. This position was, indeed, endorsed fully by the EU, as well, in May 1992.

Today, naturally, FYROM’s Constitution, following UN, EU, and Greek pressure, officially denies such claims; yet, it is exactly this kind of propaganda that one sees everywhere: speeches, textbooks, maps, documents, monuments, state buildings etc. The list is endless.

Well-educated Europeans, who have not forgotten either their ancient or modern history, are deeply upset by such practices. The same is true of the US, where House Resolution 356, which was co-sponsored by almost one fourth of the Members of the US House of Representatives, clearly indicates that “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia should stop the utilization of materials that violate provisions of the United Nations-brokered Interim Accord between the FYROM and Greece, regarding hostile activities and propaganda, and should work with the United Nations and Greece to achieve longstanding United States and United Nations policy goals of finding a mutually acceptable official name for the FYROM”.

The same view was also expressed in the US Senate Resolution 300, whereas the recent Senate Resolution 476, co-sponsored among others by Hillary Clinton and Barak Obama, describes Greece as a major strategic partner and ally of the United States “in bringing political stability and economic development to the volatile Balkan region”. 

Dear friends,

The Greek government, several months ago, took an unprecedented and courageous step in order to reach a solution to this long-standing problem: to accept the term “Macedonia” in the context of a composite name for that country. This runs against a forbidding 67,8% of public opinion who did not wish the term “Macedonia” to be used at all.

As the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs has underlined, when parts of a historical region fall into more than one country, the new area usually uses an adjective to distinguish itself from the older one – New Mexico and Mexico are one such example. Yet, the leaders of Skopje have so far rejected even such meager changes in their attitude that would immediately solve the problem.

It is noteworthy that Greece has covered 75% of the ground for a solution, by being willing to accept a compound name for FYROM, negotiated within the UN framework. After all, UN Security Council Resolution 817 specifically provides that “the difference over the name of the state (i.e. FYROM) needs to be resolved in the interest of the maintenance of peaceful and good neighborly relations in the region”.

As the recent NATO summit in Bucharest has shown, the problem remains unresolved. Unfortunately, a section of the international media was unable to deal in depth with this issue.

In fact, Greece has not barred FYROM from NATO. We made it clear that failure by Skopje to reach a timely mutual agreement and cease its nationalistic rhetoric and irredentist propaganda against our northern province of Macedonia would result in vetoing their accession process in the Northern Alliance. We made it perfectly clear that the name issue does not constitute a problem of merely historic, psychological or emotional dimensions, but an important issue of good neighbourly relations. As the final NATO communiqué clearly showed, Greek views were seriously taken into account and FYROM’s entry into NATO can only take place upon resolving the name issue. It is unthinkable to have an entire country schooled that Greece’s largest province, Macedonia, should rightfully be theirs and at the same time demand Greece’s consent on becoming partners and allies.

Greece has recognised FYROM’s progress in several fields and clearly wishes to encourage its Euro-Atlantic course. We do not want to humiliate Skopje. Far from it; a solution to the name problem and a stop to its unacceptable irredentist propaganda would create a win-win solution. In this context, right after the Summit, the Greek Prime Minister has extended a new invitation to our neighbouring country to negotiate within the UN framework a final and mutually accepted name, a name to be used erga omnes.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Allow me to describe Greece as a pioneer EU country in bringing political stability and economic development in Southeast Europe. In so doing, it does not only promote its own political and economic goals, but also those of the European Union to which both Ireland and Greece belong.

In recent years, Greek capital invested in the area exceeds 13 billion euros; thousands of Greek enterprises are established in the Balkans, and Greek banks operate more than 2,300 branches in the region. Moreover, the remittances of more than one million Balkan workers who live and work in Greece considerably boosts our neighbouring economies. By promoting the Euro-Atlantic perspective of the entire Southeast Europe and by likewise encouraging intensive Greek business activity in Southeast Europe, my country has significantly contributed to the stability and the development of the entire region.

In the political field, Greece has supported both Bulgaria and Romania in becoming members of the Euro-Atlantic organizations. We have also supported Slovenia, which first paved the way towards EU integration in the region. Albania has recently been invited to join NATO and both Albania and Montenegro are strongly encouraged in their EU prospects. At this point, it would perhaps be useful to inform you that my country has a five-year program of its own, for extending development assistance in the Balkans: the Hellenic Plan for the Economic Reconstruction of the Balkans. The budget for this plan exceeds 550 million euros, earmarked for big-scale infrastructure projects, like the European Corridor X, and for private initiatives bolstering cooperation between the Balkan countries.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

As I hope has become obvious, my country has a clear strategic vision for the wider area of Southeast Europe. Minister Dora Bakoyannis has, in addition, put forward a set of concrete proposals at the EU General Affairs and External Relations Council of November 2007.

The Greek initiative focuses on five basic axes:

 To immediately sign Stabilisation and Association Agreements with  Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina;

 To encourage all countries of the Western Balkans to apply for membership of the European Union;

 To immediately start accession negotiations, upon fulfillment of the relevant criteria, with each country;

 To proceed to road maps for visa liberalisations, in order to translate the European perspective into something tangible for their citizens; 

 To provide concrete and well structured further financial assistance.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Greece advocates its strategic vision for the wider region not only through EU and its own programmes. It has strongly encouraged the development of regional initiatives, as well. Back in 1996, the Southeast European Cooperation Project started. Nowadays, the Stability Pact for South East Europe has evolved into the Regional Cooperation Council (RCC). Within this newly established framework the SEECP will undoubtedly highlight the notion of regional co-ownership. Greece is also an active member of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Initiative, created in 1992, and has recently taken the step of linking this important regional formation with the EU. The first Black Sea Synergy Foreign Ministerial Meeting of BSEC and the EU took place on February this year, in Kiev and was the kick-off high-level political event of this year.

Dear friends,

The intention of this presentation was to underline the problems and perspectives of Southeast Europe. I have tried to present, as clearly as possible, the problems that still need to be addressed, as well as the success stories of recent years. 

I have spoken of the new “arch of stability” comprising Bulgaria and Romania to the East and Northeast, with Slovenia and Croatia to the Northwest.

I have emphasized that we are particularly satisfied with Croatia’s and Albania’s integration into NATO in the Bucharest Summit and we support their European perspective as well.

I have also mentioned the progress Montenegro is making towards its Euro-Atlantic perspectives. A progress that we all strongly encourage.

On the other hand, I have given particular emphasis to the most problematic issues in the Balkans, such as the situation in Kosovo and the name – and not only – issue concerning FYROM and Greece.

Last but not least, I have described Greece’s commitment, as the oldest EU and NATO member in the region, to the political stability and economic progress of the entire region of Southeast Europe. A commitment reflected in my country’s national, EU and regional initiatives which I have described in some detail.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Stability in Southeast Europe is crucial for Europe, and, naturally, for Greece. My country, because of its important geostrategic position, has the political will and, by now, a long experience for promoting stability and prosperity in the region.

Our joint strategy should now be clear: repeat the success stories of the past; and face the challenges of the remaining problems with imagination and perseverance.

I am confident that, with good planning, and with political determination, we will again rise to the challenge.

We will respond to the call of times.

Thank you.





© Copyright 2008 Ministry of Foreign Affairs
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