Athens, 8 April 2009
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: Good morning. I welcome you to the refurbished “George Seferis” hall, where – as of today – we return for the briefings that we try to have at least once a week.
Regarding the Minister’s programme: Today, 8 April, at 13:00, Foreign Minister Ms. Dora Bakoyannis will receive the new British Ambassador to Athens, Mr. Landsman, in a protocol meeting at the Foreign Ministry. At 13:45, she will receive European Ombudsman Mr. Diamantouros, and this afternoon she will fly to Paris, where, together with Deputy Foreign Minister Mr. Kassimis, she will accompany Prime Minister Karamanlis to the opening of the “Mount Athos and the Byzantine Empire – Treasures of the Holy Mountain” exhibit. The opening will take place tomorrow, 9 April at the Petit Palais, in Paris.
This exhibit is comprised of 181 relics from Mount Athos, and will be open through 5 July. All of these items are being exhibited for the first time outside Greece, and 60 of the relics are being exhibited for the first time outside Mount Athos.
As for the Deputy Foreign Ministers’ programmes, on Holy Monday, 13 April, Deputy Foreign Minister Valinakis will give a welcome speech at the international meeting on “The Mediterranean: a space of knowledge, exchange, cooperation and the Euromediterranean University”. This event will take place at Zappeion. On the same day, Mr. Valinakis will meet with the High Commissioner for Cyprus, Mr. Giorgios Iacovou, who will be visiting our country on 13 April and will have a number of meetings.
Today at 10:00, Deputy Foreign Minister Varvitsiotis met with the Chinese Ambassador to Athens. Tomorrow at 11:30, he will meet with the Swedish Ambassador, and at 16:00 he will meet with the new British Ambassador, Mr. Landsman. Holy Tuesday through Holy Thursday, 14-16 April, he will participate in the proceedings of the 20th Meeting of BSEC Foreign Ministers, which is taking place in Yerevan, Armenia.
Are there any questions?
Ms. Tasouli: I would like to ask when the remains of the unfortunate student in Italy will be returning to Greece, and whether you know anything about the condition of the Greeks who were injured.
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: As you know, there is a unit from the Embassy in the region affected by the earthquake, and they are assisting the Greeks there in any way possible. You are also aware of the Foreign Ministry’s actions regarding the transporting of students and other Greeks who wished to leave the affected area. Regarding the Greek student’s remains, we are in communication with the family, who of course have the final say. The will of the state to cover the transportation expenses is a given.
Ms. Melisova: Do you know whether the Minister will have meetings during her stay in Paris – and what will be the subject of those talks?
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: Ms. Bakoyannis will participate in the luncheon the President of the French Republic, Mr. Sarkozy, is hosting for Prime Minister Karamanlis, as well as in the meeting Mr. Karamanlis will have with his French counterpart.
Mr. Santamouris: Is there any comment from the Greek side regarding the volley of expressions of scepticism from Europeans regarding Turkey’s accession perspective following Obama’s urgings.
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: Greece has a specific policy regarding Turkey’s European perspective. You know this policy, and I don’t need to repeat it. We believe that this is the right policy for the interests of Greece, the interests of the European Union, and, of course, the interests of Turkey. A European Turkey that will have fully implemented the European prerequisites and standards, a European Turkey can and must – provided it fulfils these – become a member of the European Union. That is the Greek position.
It is up to Turkey, which has the primary and main responsibility, to move ahead and implement policies that will render feasible its accession to the European Union and keep advocates of a special relationship in the minority. It is first and foremost Turkey that – through its own actions – can give a definitive answer to the dilemma ‘full membership or special relationship?’. Turkey has the role.
Journalist: The role or the final say?
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: The main role, say and responsibility.
Ms. Adam: A procedural question. Whether the exhibits in Paris – and especially the 60 that have never before left Mount Athos – will be exhibited in Athens afterwards.
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: I don’t know. I’ll find out and let you know.
Ms. Adam: Based on the position the government is putting forward regarding Turkey’s accession perspective, it appears to be fully opposed to the definitive stance that has now been expressed by Germany and France, who are inclined in favour of just a special relationship. What is your comment on that issue? A third and final question: Why did Ms. Bakoyannis choose not to discuss Turkey’s provocative conduct in the Aegean during here recent meeting?
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: Regarding your first question, you know that the strategy being followed by the European Union – and consequently by its member states – throughout Turkey’s accession process is within the framework of decisions taken unanimously on the level of the European Council and the Council of Ministers of the European Union.
These decisions have, as I said, unanimously set down that the ultimate goal of the accession process is accession. This decision has not been altered. A shift in this decision requires corresponding unanimous decisions.
The views you mentioned concerning a special relationship are in fact being expressed. These remain the approaches and reflections of certain partners – that is the reality of the situation. Greece is closely monitory and carrying out its own analyses of the public debate, the political discussion that is taking place in Europe on this subject. At this time it has concluded on and insists on the correctness of its own policy.
This is not an open door policy, without prerequisites and requirements. It is not a policy that there can be an enlargement of the European family with the participation of new states if those new states have not complied to the letter with the rules and principles that are the binding link and – in the end – the strength of this family.
So there can be no accession on terms that have been imposed on this family from without.
It has its own rules, it has its own principles. And those who want to accede will have to respect these first – not in words or declarations, but through specific actions.
This is the Greek position. It is an honest and realistic position that does not deprive Turkey of the incentive or vision to shift its stance, to change its policies where necessary on domestic matters and on its international and external conduct, including, of course, where our country is concerned.
Regarding your other question, I remind you – first – that the meeting took place within the framework of the Forum on the Alliance of Civilizations. Second, this meeting lasted 20 or 25 minutes. I don’t say this in answer to your question, but so we know the situation in which the meeting took place.
During this meeting, the Foreign Minister reiterated to her Turkish counterpart the need for improvement in Greek-Turkish relations.
A message can be of few words, and also very clear.
Beyond that, there was particular discussion of the course of the consultations on the Cyprus issue, where the familiar stances were reiterated.
Let me remind you here of something that should be taken into consideration. The recent Turkish exercise “Hegemon” – following Greek actions – was carried out in such a way as not to create problems, as it initially appeared it would, concerning sovereign rights and responsibilities that our country has, based on international law and international regulations.
So, as you see, the protection of interests within the framework of Greek-Turkish relations is constant, and the effort strong.
It can’t be judged on the basis of one meeting, and neither can such conclusions be drawn. Greece is exercising a firm policy of protecting its interests so as for not even a jot to be yielded from what we consider to be our rights and interests.
Ms. Adam: The Greek government hasn’t clarified for us the NOTAM that was issued for the exercise; who issued it and for what region.
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: I don’t have that data. I’ll get it and give it to you.
Ms. Adam: Could we please have it this afternoon? That is, who issued the NOTAM based on which the “Hegemon” exercise was carried out?
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: I’ll get it and you will be informed on this matter.
Mr. Vitalis: Having heard your reiteration of the Greek position on Turkey’s accession, I would like to ask you this: In a short time there will be an assessment of Turkey by the European Union regarding its obligations and, principally, the implementation of the Ankara Protocol. Whether you have any indications at this time that Turkey will implement this thing in the end. And second, whether you are open to a possible extension that will be requested by Turkey in exchange for the Rasmussen affair.
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: I’ll start with your last question. I am not aware, nor has it been officially recorded anywhere – and there is, in any case, no reliable information, if you will, to the effect – that there has been an agreement, essentially under the table, for an exchange of Turkey’s support for the NATO Secretary General in return for issues unrelated to that – that is, issues that have to do with how the European Union exercises its policy and how it implements agreed decisions.
Speaking of agreed decisions, I would like to remind you that the assessment of Turkey with regard to the implementation of the Protocol on the Customs Union was agreed unanimously to be carried out at the end of this year. There are no indications of a shift in Turkey’s stance at this time.
Ms. Kourbela: Mr. Spokesman, I would like to ask what Greece’s contribution will be to the International Monetary Fund, based on the decision taken by the European Union.
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: I don’t know. I will have to look into it and let you know.
Ms. Kourbela: Another question I want to ask is whether all these discussions about Turkey are impacting the course of the accession negotiations. That is, will the discussions take place as scheduled on the chapters …
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: When you say “all these discussions”, what discussions are you referring to?
Ms. Kourbela: I mean the discussions taking place at the highest level, like the transatlantic conference, in general on whether Turkey will accede or not, etc.
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: At this time, nothing has been set down officially that might lead to the conclusion that Turkey’s accession course will evolve on different terms from those under which it has been carried out all these years.
Mr. Kapoutsis: I have two questions. First, whether you have a comment on the elections in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, where the candidate of the governing party VMRO, Mr. Ivanov, won an easy victory and, in fact, made some statements and said that he wants the problem with Greece to be resolved. Second, your comment on U.S. President Barack Obama’s meeting with the Patriarch, which took place under conditions of secrecy, without photographs. A relatively low-key meeting, I would say.
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: I’ll start with the elections in FYROM. According to international observers, the presidential and municipal elections in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia were carried out – in general – without irregularities that might alter the election outcome, as was the case in the previous election process. Let me add here that the international observers themselves noted that there is room for improvement, and they supported this because they identified cases of voter intimidation during the election period, as well as cases of double voting.
As a general position: Greece believes that the recent elections are a step on the part of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia towards European election standards. That being said, however, the reform efforts of our neighbouring country must be continued and intensified so that the criteria vital to the country’s European and Euroatlantic course can be fulfilled.
I would like to take this opportunity to express the hope that the newly elected President Ivanov will work in this direction and will contribute to the resolution of the name issue, which – as set down in relevant NATO and EU decisions – is intrinsic to good neighbourly relations and, ultimately, a prerequisite for this country’s approach to European and Euroatlantic institutions.
Regarding the meeting of the U.S. President with the Patriarch, I think the photograph has now been circulated – at some point this morning.
In any case, history and developments are not written or determined by photographs, but by the substance of events. And the substance of the events is what is recorded in the statements made by the Ecumenical Patriarch immediately following his meeting with the American President.
As for the U.S. President’s visit to Turkey, I would like to make – and I think this will be useful – an overall assessment. An overall assessment of this first official visit of the newly elected President to Europe and the visits he carried out, starting with the NATO Summit and concluding in Iraq.
It is our assessment that the messages of this visit – the positions and views expressed – are positive.
Starting from NATO. It was positive and in line with Greek priorities and forecasts that NATO-EU cooperation was supported – and we supported this – on the basis of respect for the institutional autonomy of the two organizations. One critical point of priority for our country.
Regarding Afghanistan. Let me remind you here that very early on, Greece supported in all the relevant fora and discussions that the solution of the Afghanistan problem, the smooth reconstruction and course of this country, requires not just military means, but also political, non-military social actions. The new strategy for Afghanistan unveiled by the U.S. President moves according to precisely this thinking. It is a new approach that provides for a combination of military and non-military means, and it includes the regional dimension of relations with Pakistan.
Regarding the EU-U.S. Summit Meeting. It is positive that what was supported was an equal relationship of mutual respect and benefits between the United States and the European Union. This is Greece’s firm view. We have always supported and worked for this equal, mutually beneficial relationship.
The Forum for the Alliance of Civilizations. It is positive that the message being sent by the new American administration is a message of an honest opening up to the Muslim world, far from the rationale of opposition and inherent suspicion. Greece believes in, supports, advocates and welcomes this development.
The U.S. interest in the Middle East is also positive. A strong interest that began very early on with the appointment of a special envoy for this region. Confirmation that in order for stability and security to return to this region, we have to have a comprehensive approach to problems; an approach that does not allow and does not rest on the exclusion of states such as Syria and Iran. This has been a firm, long-standing position of Greece all these years, and it is the cornerstone of its policy on the Middle East.
The Obama visit to Turkey. This visit unquestionable concerns and is linked to the assessments made by, and the priorities of, the U.S. in an exceedingly vulnerable and difficult region for American foreign policy. A region that comprises the immediate neighbourhood of Turkey, which – as a NATO member – is also an ally of the United States.
Greek policy is not determined by others, in relation to other countries that have their own particular characteristics, their own pending problems and their own major challenges to face. Greece is a European country – has been a member of the European family for many years now. It is a stable democracy that has clear aspirations and goals in its foreign policy. It has a vision for its region. A vision of stability, peace and progress.
As regards issues of particular interest to Greece, let me start by saying that regarding the Cyprus problem – as set down in statements from the Cypriot leadership – the statements of the American President are positive because he talked about the need for a solution – which is Greece’s pursuit and policy – of a bizonal, bicommunal Federation.
It is positive that mention was made of the need for the Halki Seminary to open – and made in the particular context; that is, the need for respect of democratic principles and values, the need to respect religious freedoms.
Skopje. The statement made by U.S. Secretary of State Ms. Clinton – within the framework of the EU-U.S. meeting held on the level of Foreign Ministers – that a solution must be found is positive. In fact, she said that she herself sees it as totally logical that this solution might be found in a compound name, saying, specifically, that it shouldn’t be hard to find such a solution, and that the parties should be encouraged to reach such a solution.
Finally, the reference to Turkey’s European perspective. As I had the opportunity to say earlier, this is also the strategic pursuit of Greece. A strategic pursuit that has been assessed by everyone – by the current government and the previous governments – as serving stability in the region, Greek interests, Europe’s interests and the interests of Turkey.
From time to time here in the press room, you have wondered aloud what Greece’s policy will rest on should Turkey cease to desire accession. So it is important that Turkey was encouraged by the American President along this path – the path of Europe – which, however, means and presupposes Turkey’s adaptation and the adoption of reforms and conduct that are compatible with European rules and European principles and European prerequisites.
Finally, the visit to Iraq. It is positive that through this visit to Iraq – with also indicates the great interest of the United States in this region that neighbours on Turkey – it is important that the policy of the withdrawal of American troops from Iraq is confirmed. This is also in accord with Greece’s more general thinking regarding the Middle East region as well as this region in particular.
That is a general assessment of Mr. Obama’s presence in Europe from his participation in the NATO Summit Meeting through to his visit to Iraq.
Mr. Karakostas: PASOK obviously has another reading of the Obama visit. It requested that the Council on Foreign Policy be convened, and I would like to ask whether you will convene it.
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: The date on which the National Council on Foreign Policy will convene will be announced immediately after Easter, as will the date for the convening of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defense and Foreign Affairs.
Mr. Karakostas: And a second question. We are coming in for criticism as a country regarding the acquittal of Mr. Plevris – whether you have any comment on that.
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: Extremist views like those expressed by the person to whom you referred do not represent and do not correspond to the beliefs and feelings of the Greek people, as set down in perfect clarity and authoritatively by the Hellenic Parliament in the resolution declaring 27 January Holocaust Remembrance Day. I would add, in fact, that extremist views such as these essentially insult the Greek people as a whole; a people who fought with all their power against the Axis powers, against the forces of Nazism and fascism.
Mr. Kapoutsis: There is a statement today from Mr. Loverdos, who is PASOK’s designated hitter on foreign policy issues, that is particularly critical of the policy of Ms. Bakoyannis and the Foreign Ministry. He uses some very negative terms – unpredictable, and others. Would you like to make a comment on that?
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: You know that I don’t comment on political statements.
A general statement: The opposition’s job is to criticise, and the government’s job is to implement its policies.
Beyond that, speaking as a diplomat, I believe that it is a mistake – and a big one, at that – when foreign policy and foreign policy issues become the object of party politics and not constructive criticism.
Public dialogue on foreign policy issues, the political dialogue on foreign policy issues, is desirable and must take place, be substantial, contribute to and in the end assist in the exercising of the country’s foreign policy.
That is different from a rationale of one political party attacking another.
Mr. Santamouris: One question is whether the Obama visit raises any points that are not positive for Greek diplomacy or that might give rise to concerns – particularly regarding issues of particular interest to Greece. The second is whether you think that within the framework of the bizonal, bicommunal federation and its achievement for the resolution of the Cyprus issue there might also come a backsliding in the quantitative equality of the sides, beyond politics. Thank you.
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: Your second question concerns the substance of the ongoing negotiations and talks. I won’t go into a discussion of that. We will have time when the results – when the picture is clearer and public – to discuss this.
As regards the other issue you raised, the concern or the points from the Obama visit that might – as you said – worry Greece. Two words. The world – the whole international scene – is in a period of transition. A re-ordering is taking place.
There are two catalytic facts that together create this new environment: The major international economic crisis and the coming to power of the new American administration. These are two major events that in combination are creating new conditions. For some they mark a new period, and for others there herald one.
New powers are emerging, old certainties are being revised or called into question. In such a transitional world, we also have the coexistence of the elements of uncertainty and expectations. In such times, two other elements also exist together: Challenges and opportunities. It is the duty of governments and leaderships to meet the former – the challenges – and capitalise on the latter.
Greece – Greek foreign policy and the Foreign Ministry – is analyzing this data in depth in order to take the necessary decisions regarding the individual, mainly tactical, moves of Greek foreign policy, because its strategic choices are a constant.
They are constants because they are self-evident:
We want stability and peace in our region, and we want this within the framework of full respect for our national interests and rights. It is a clear strategy. We have talked about Europe. We have talked about Turkey. We have talked about the Balkans. We have to implement this policy and continue implementing it in the broader international and regional context I referred to: the revision and re-ordering that are taking place around us.
During this new period, Greece, too – along with all of the countries in the world – will have to assess developments in depth in order to take the necessary decisions. We are at precisely that stage.
Ms. Adam: Beyond the dithyrambic on the Obama tour …
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: It wasn’t dithyrambic, Ms. Adam, it was realistic.
Ms. Adam: In my opinion, it is dithyrambic. What is the Ministry’s comment on the repeated and very intense reactions in Strasbourg and Prague from Ms. Merkel and Mr. Sarkozy regarding Mr. Obama’s attempt to support – to a greater extent than necessary – Turkey’s positions in NATO and Turkey’s accession to the EU. And second, what is the Ministry’s comment on Mr. Obama’s speech to the Turkish National Assembly, particularly at the point where he essentially thanked and praised Turkey’s national independence struggle of 1922, which culminated in the establishment of a democracy, which the U.S. admires to this day – that is, the Kemal democracy?
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: I’ll start with the last one, and I will repeat something I have said again and again regarding similar issues. History cannot be re-written. The facts are its indisputable eyewitness, and regarding the specific case you are referring to, I would add that the U.S. Consul in Izmir at the time, George Horton, was also an eyewitness who set down his testimony in his well-known book “The Blight of Asia”. That’s it for historical references.
I will disagree, and I think this serves to spark a reply to your “dithyrambic” comment.
Foreign policy has two poor counsellors: optimism and pessimism. Foreign policy’s best counsel is realism. Because this allows for correct evaluations, the right planning and the right decisions.
So I don’t agree at all with the characterization “dithyrambic”. It is a realistic assessment that sees those points that coincide with the thinking of Greek foreign policy, and I don’t think that Greece has ever – at any time and whatever the political party – supported positions other than those I set out.
With regard to the Turkish efforts and Turkey’s stance at the NATO Summit Meeting. Any benefit or cost of given conduct is not – as you know – apparent on the same day. The fact is that unanimous decisions were taken. The unanimous decision was the election of Mr. Rasmussen. Beyond that, the assessment of how each member state moves in the pursuit of its interests is a matter for evaluation.
Ms. Adam: Excuse me, but you didn’t answer me. I asked for the Ministry’s comment on whether the Greek side agrees with the repeated, very strong stances and public statements of Merkel and Sarkozy regarding the U.S. efforts at Strasbourg and Prague.
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: Greece’s firm position, as a member of the European Union, is to defend institutional autonomy in EU decision making. Decisions on its course, its problems, its aspirations and its planning are taken in accordance with the institutional provisions that are in place. So the decisions are taken by the 27 member states of the European Union. It’s as simple as that.
Beyond that, I don’t think anyone can ask any country not to make assessments or not to express its views. But the decisions of the European Union are taken by its member states. That is clear, and there is no way around it.
Mr. Athanasopoulos: I have had my hand up a few times, so please accept a few consecutive questions. You mentioned at the beginning of the briefing that there are unanimous decisions from the European Union regarding Turkey and aimed at accession. Correct me if I’m wrong, but I think that this specific unanimous decision is the only one that does not reflect with absolute clarity that the ultimate goal of Turkey’s European course is accession. Correct me on that if I’m mistaken. Second, you said that you encourage American support (with or without inverted commas) for Turkey’s European perspective …
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: Not encourage …
Mr. Athanasopoulos: Whatever – you characterize U.S. encouragement as positive …
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: Towards Turkey, to persist on its European course.
Mr. Athanasopoulos: Yes, pardon me. But as there are the Franco-German reactions my colleague Ms. Adam mentioned earlier, are you preparing for an alternative scenario on the table? Third, given that the Minister did not refer at all to Greek-Turkish problems in the Aegean, do you perhaps know whether the U.S. government – which has supposedly been briefed; Clinton by Bakoyannis and Obama by Karamanlis – passed on our complaints to Turkey? Thank you.
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: I’ll start with the last question. The Aegean and Greek-Turkish relations. The promotion of Greek positions and keeping all our collocutors apprised of these positions is ongoing, and this cannot – and I see no reason why it should – be called into question, even indirectly.
Greek foreign policy, Greek diplomacy, the Foreign Minister, the Prime Minister, brief our collocutors on Greece’s positions and its interests, defending these in all meetings.
This firm policy is not altered by the fact that in a specific meeting of 20 to 25 minutes, there was not detailed reference to Aegean issues, but there was a strong reminder to the Turkish Foreign Minister that the atmosphere in Greek-Turkish relations must improve.
I don’t think anyone in this room reckons or believes that following this meeting the Turkish Foreign Minister or the bureaucracy of the Turkish Foreign Ministry came to the conclusion that Greece has no problem and is not reacting to Turkey’s violational stance on the Aegean. That’s just to put things in their proper perspective.
Beyond that, as I said, we keep all our collocutors apprised. All of them, always, consistently. We feel strong because we believe that international law is our advocate. And it is also important that the U.S. is heading in the direction of ratifying the Convention on the Law of the Sea.
Mr. Vitalis: Wait a minute, because there is a blank here …
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: Wherever there is a blank, I’ll fill it in if I can.
Mr. Vitalis: If I remember correctly, my colleague asked whether you know if Mr. Obama passed on Greece’s position on the Aegean.
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: I have no information in that regard. So it may have happened or it may not have. But that does not avert or alter our effort. Our effort will continue firmly. In the ongoing efforts being made, there are difficult moments and easy moments. That is how it is in the foreign policy of every country.
Mr. Athanasopoulos: This, if you know – I don’t know. Maybe you will have to refer back. Does the unanimous European decision on Turkey clearly have accession as its final goal, or not?
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: For Greece, it does.
Mr. Athanasopoulos: Yes, but we don’t care whether it does for us. We want it to have this in general, Mr. Spokesman. The other thing is, given that you said you see the U.S. encouragement of Turkey’s European perspective as positive, to what extent – due to Franco-German reactions – are you preparing or have you prepared for alternative scenarios?
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: As regards whether it is clear or less clear that the final destination is accession. The process’s being called one of accession is indicative of the direction in which the process is headed, and moreover there is no decision that talks about a special relationship.
That is the public debate that is taking place. They are various positions that are expressed from time to time, and right now they are in the minority. I will repeat that Turkey will have to answer to the political/theoretical dilemma hovering over Brussels: “special relationship or full accession”. Turkey has to answer with its own moves, its own decisions, its own specific actions. Not with intentions. Dilemmas are not resolved by intentions.
Beyond that, there is the question that you raised: What is the Foreign Ministry doing, whether there is a Plan B. So I want to tell you that the Foreign Ministry’s job is to study every possibility. To draw up all the working hypotheses. Because as you know, in dilemma situations, there are in-between positions and greys and other shades. So it is not just a matter of whether we are studying this particular dilemma. We study all of them.
But our policy – the one we have concluded on as the Foreign Ministry and across the party spectrum – I haven’t seen any of the major political forces in the country call this orientation into question. I haven’t seen it.
Ms. Kourbela: I would just like to remind you that when Turkey made its first application for accession and was turned down by the Council, it reapplied for accession. It never reapplied for a special relationship.
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: I mentioned that earlier. Thank you.
Ms. Karaviti: In Istanbul, the U.S. President said, if I am not mistaken, that if Turkey can be a member of NATO, I don’t see why it can’t sell apricots in Europe. I want to ask whether the Greek government, and by extension the European Union, feel in some way responsible, particularly because there were some previous high-level meetings on the fact that the American administration does not know what EU accession means.
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: I think that would be a very interesting question for the European Commission spokesperson to answer, provided the talks you referred to actually took place. It is obvious that this is not the case in the European Union: The EU has its own rules, its own characteristics, and takes decisions based on its own institutional texts.
Mr. Meletis: Mr. Spokesman, given that, as you said, the Foreign Ministry follows a realistic policy, could you tell us specifically what the specific benefit for Greece was from the Obama visit to Europe and Turkey? And second, you said that there was a discussion between Ms. Bakoyannis and Mr. Babacan on the general improvement in the atmosphere, and other things needn’t be mentioned.
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: No, other things were said, but not on that subject.
Mr. Meletis: Yes, precisely because the other things were said, but not those things that concern us – tension in the Aegean, etc. – and the Halki and Thrace issues were mentioned, do you consider that these are the issues being raised in the dialogue on the improvement of the climate in Greek-Turkish relations?
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: It has been said repeatedly with regard to the Thrace issue – both here and on the level of Foreign Minister – that there is no reciprocity on matters of human rights, freedoms and respect for religious freedoms.
Greece makes its own policy. There is no interrelation or dependency between the issues and obligations Turkey has undertaken as an accession candidate country and as a country that wants to play a role in bridging civilizations, concerning the Patriarchate and the Halki Seminary. That is its own issue, which it has open with all of the countries that believe in the need to respect religious freedoms, and the countries of Europe for the most part.
I add, in closing this issue: When you say to your counterpart that the atmosphere in Greek-Turkish relations must improve, you obviously aren’t saying it to yourself. You raise the issue because the other has to make moves to improve Greek-Turkish relations.
The fact that in this specific discussion there was no extended reference to Turkey’s violations obviously doesn’t leave the Turkish Foreign Minister with the impression that Greece doesn’t have any problems anymore with this unacceptable tactic of Turkey’s.
Mr. Meletis: That’s one issue, and the other I wanted to ask about is whether in the meeting with the Brazilian Foreign Minister Ms. Bakoyannis felt the same need to express the course of the implementation of measures she has announce regarding Thrace, because now that’s what you are saying to us, that “it doesn’t concern reciprocity or anything else – Mr. Babacan just showed his interest.”
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: I said that in the meeting with Mr. Babacan, Ms. Bakoyannis didn’t raise it. Mr. Babacan made a brief reference to it.
Now, concerning what you asked me. The last time a detailed presentation of Greece’s concerns, positions and call for there to be adaptation – for there to be such conduct on the part of Turkey as to allow for further improvement in relations – was made on the level of Foreign Ministers, it was made in a long meeting Ms. Bakoyannis had with her counterpart in New York, in the presence of high-level Ministry personnel.
And I remind you that at that meeting in New York – this past September – there was for the first time in recent years a strong reference to the need for improvement in Greek-Turkish relations and a change of stance from Turkey in the Foreign Minister’s speech to the UN General Assembly.
Beyond that, as you know, a series of demarches have been made on all levels. There are reactions, there are moves that are sometimes made public, sometimes not, like the actions taken regarding the recent Turkish exercise “Hegemon” and the recent “Noble Archer” exercise as concerns Agios Efstratios.
These are the components, the elements of a specific policy. This policy does not shift – nor is its nature altered – if, as I said, in one meeting among many, a 20-minute meeting, lengthy reference is not made to Aegean issues. And this meeting was preceded by a few days by the “Hegemon” exercise, regarding which the top priority for Greece – that is, how the European countries participating in this exercise would move – concluded in a manner satisfactory to our country.
Mr. Barakat: Everything you said regarding Obama’s visit to Turkey and not to Greece is understandable and respected. But – and I don’t know whether you agree that Greece’s role was very weak and Greece was missing, was absent from many things and many problems in the region. And the other question: Whether the Minister has considered visiting Iraq soon.
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: We are considering it. It is a matter of scheduling and finding the best date for the Minister’s visit to Iraq.
I disagree categorically with your assessment regarding a reduced role or the absence of Greece from the Middle East.
I’ll mention some examples.
Greece had a very strong presence during the Lebanon crisis. An initiative, actions and efforts on the part of Greece resulted in a watershed discussion on Middle East issues in the UN Security Council, on the level of Foreign Ministers – a discussion that changed the climate and created dynamics. For the first time – and I am not exaggerating – Greece was called upon to participate in an International Conference on the Middle East; the Annapolis process. The Foreign Minister has visited the region repeatedly; Israel, Syria. She has visited Lebanon and a visit to Iraq is being scheduled, as I said. The President of the Republic and the Prime Minister have visited Egypt.
I’ll also add – with no intention of overdoing it – the very active and substantial policy Greece has developed within the EU Council of Foreign Ministers on issues concerning the Middle East, Gaza, the humanitarian aid we sent there. We have a voice and a say.
I have one criticism: A “greater role”, I understand. But I do not accept “absence”. A greater role, yes, it is being sought and will come. It is an ongoing endeavour. That, I understand. But I cannot accept the criticism concerning absence or inertia.
Ms. Adam: Firstly, Mr. Spokesman, as you refer very frequently to the smooth carrying out of the “Hegemon” exercise, let me remind you that this afternoon we are expecting to find out who issued the NOTAM, and for what areas …
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: We’ve said that, Ms. Adam. It has been noted by me and by my associates.
Ms. Adam: Second, since September, when the Bakoyannis-Babacan meeting took place, there has been a crescendo of Turkish provocations: Agathonisi, Farmakonisi, some vessels in Rafina, Kastelorizo – a long list. And you tell us that “this was not discussed at the meeting the day before yesterday in Istanbul.” From the information we have, the information you are giving us is what Mr. Babacan asked Ms. Bakoyannis to answer him on.
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: No, don’t misapprehend me.
Ms. Adam: Could you perhaps tell us in detail what Ms. Bakoyannis asked Mr. Babacan to answer her on – on all subjects?
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: You know how these discussions are held. You know how a briefing takes place. I referred to only one issue – that of Thrace – because your colleague asked about it previously. And I said it was raised as a question by Mr. Babacan and was answered within the context we are aware of. We make our own policy, and we don’t connect it, we don’t make it dependent – nor do we put it in the same bag with what Turkey does as obligations to the Ecumenical Patriarchate.
Two other issues were discussed. The Cyprus issue …
Ms. Adam: What did Ms. Bakoyannis ask Mr. Babacan on that?
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: I’m not going to re-enact meetings. It was, after all, a private meeting.
Ms. Adam: Then you are doing it in part when you tell me what Ms. Bakoyannis answered to a question from Mr. Babacan. So I’ll turn the question around. What did Bakoyannis ask on this issue, and what did Mr. Babacan answer? That’s what I’m asking for.
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: Ms. Adam, I am not going to re-enact private meetings between foreign ministers; meetings I don’t participate in. With regard to this meeting …
Mr. Sourmelidis: (off microphone) Who requested it?
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: It arose as a result of mutual sounding out on the diplomatic level.
Ms. Adam: Great. On what subject?
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: Let’s not over-dramatize meetings like this. Let’s not give them dimensions that they don’t have. You asked me something specific and substantial, and I want to answer to that, not to questions that I believe are aimed at creating a sensation.
You asked me about a substantial matter: “following this discussion in New York, why did the Turkish conduct continue?”.
I answer you: If the issues had been resolved in the meeting in New York, it would have been announced to you that a solution had been found on the Aegean issues; that Turkey’s policy had changed.
But that wasn’t the case. Greek-Turkish relations have the characteristics that you are aware of. The governments of Greece have made long-standing efforts to improve these characteristics without damaging national interests. It is an ongoing effort – a difficult effort – and that is also what the Greek government is doing at this time. That is what the Foreign Ministry and all Ministry officials competent on these issues are doing.
We made an assessment of Greek-Turkish relations last year – the Foreign Minister said there was stagnancy in these relations. She said that there needed to be improvement in these relations. It is an ongoing effort, Ms. Adam, and you have been well aware of this all these years you have been covering diplomatic news. It has never stopped. Because these are the characteristics of Greek-Turkish relations. The effort is aimed at shifting them and going to something else. It is a difficult effort, but it is continuing. We will not give up on it.
Mr. Kalarytis: Greece’s policy of insisting that it wants improvement in Greek-Turkish relations and that it supports Turkey’s European course because it is in the interest of Turkey, Europe and Greece – has this policy paid off to date? That is, has Turkey’s conduct improved after so many years of this policy? Has it deteriorated? Has it stayed the same?
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: There are aspects that have improved. There are aspects that have stayed the same. In any case, Greece has made a strategic choice. And strategic choices are called ‘strategic’ because they incorporate from the very outset the dimension of strategic depth and time. It starts from 1999 …
Mr. Meletis: (off microphone) not just 1999 – 2004 as well …
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: 2004 as well. But that’s not the point. It is an integrated policy of support for Turkey’s European perspective. From 1999 to today. It has a specific philosophy. It was said that it was a strategic pursuit. We will not give it up. Tactical adjustments may be made, or changes in the state of affairs in foreign policy may lead us to adjustments of a tactical nature. But this is the strategy.
Mr. Kalarytis: (off microphone) Which aspects have improved?
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: There are the bilateral relations that have improved, economic bilateral relations, contact of the two peoples. On many levels there is a different climate, and on others there isn’t. There are difficult issues and easy issues in Greek-Turkish relations. You struggle to improve the difficult ones, and with the easy ones you try to improve them even more so a good foundation and framework can be built so that you can work on the difficult ones.
That is what Greece has been doing all these years. The question is – the reverse of your concerns – whether national interests have suffered all these years. And I don’t think Greece has lost anywhere.
We are protecting our rights and interests. Often with difficulty and great efforts, but we protect them. That is the reality of the situation.
Mr. Santamouris: Mr. Spokesman, is there anything you can announce to us regarding Ms. Bakoyannis’ meeting with Mr. Bildt in Istanbul? That’s one question. And the second is this: following the discussion on energy security at the last Summit Meeting, is there anything that would impose a change in tactical choices on member states? Tactical choices, not strategic. With regard to energy policy and international cooperation.
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: I don’t have the data to give you a thorough answer to your question. I can look into it and answer you.
Regarding the meeting with Mr. Bildt. The meeting with Mr. Bildt took place for specific reasons, beyond the fact that they meet frequently on the margins of the European Council. As you know, Sweden will take on the EU Presidency in the second half of 2009. Sweden has always been a country with specific outlooks and views on Europe’s foreign policy and various international issues. So this meeting was aimed at exploring Sweden’s intentions and thoughts regarding how it will handle issues of immediate European as well as Greek interest during its Presidency.
And it was also an opportunity to once again make clear Greece’s positions on these issues, and mainly those of particular interest to us, so that the Swedish Presidency knows what to expect as Greece’s stance on a number of issues.
Mr. Hadoulis: Beyond Mr. Ivanov’s election in Skopje, is there anything new on the name issue?
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: No, there is nothing new.
Mr. Tsaka: With Albania’s entry into NATO, Greece finds a close partner. How is it a military ally when here in Greece legislation from 1940 is still in effect – the declaration of war on the neighbouring country? We are talking de jure here, not de facto. This declaration of war has never been voted out. How can it be considered a military ally?
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: Your question is based on a misreading of the facts. As you know, the development and the depth of Greek-Albanian relations is so broad that they do not bear even the slightest resemblance to relations that, as you said, are still – according to your reading and assessment – under a status of war.
Greek-Albanian relations are deep and comprehensive and continue to improve. And, in any case, Greek-Albanian relations will be enriched by their new dimension, which is allied relations within the framework of NATO.
In closing, I would like to take a stance on the launching of the missile by North Korea. We condemn the launching of the missile by North Korea on 5 April, in violation of UN Security Council Resolution 1718. Such actions – regardless of stated intentions – work against the efforts of the international community to create confidence- and cooperation-building measures among peoples.
Our country is always on the side of cultivating a climate of cooperation and trust within the framework of the international community, and is against any action involving elements of the proliferation and spread of weapons that can cause mass destruction.
For these reasons, we call on North Korea to immediately stop such actions as threaten not only its neighbours, but humanity as well.
It is Greece’s long-standing practice to support all actions and efforts aimed at resolving problems through dialogue and based on the principles of international law, believing that only thus can security prevail on the Korean peninsula.