Athens, 3 December 2007
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: Good morning. I have a number of announcements to make.
As you already know from yesterday’s announcement, at 18:00 today, Foreign Minister Ms. Dora Bakoyannis will receive the U.S. Ambassador to Athens, Mr. Danial Speckhard, on the occasion of his taking up his duties.
With regard to the visit from the Turkish Foreign Minister, it is an official visit, as has already been announced.
The programme is as follows:
The visit starts on Tuesday, at 09:45, with the laying of a wreath at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier. The government will be represented by Deputy Foreign Minister Mr. Yannis Valinakis.
At about 10:00, there will be a private meeting at the Foreign Ministry with the Foreign Minister, followed by talks with the participation of the two delegations.
On the level of Ministry officials, we are to have the signing of the 2nd Greek-Turkish Executive Educational Programme.
Statements will be made to the press at 12:30. Immediately following this, at about 13:00, Mr. Babacan will be received by His Excellency the President of the Republic, Mr. Karolos Papoulias.
After his visit to the Presidential Mansion, a luncheon will be hosted by the Greek Foreign Minister in the Turkish Foreign Minister’s honour.
A meeting has been scheduled for 17:30 between Mr. Babacan and the leader of the main opposition party, at Parliament.
At about 19:00, Mr. Babacan and Ms. Bakoyannis will attend a forum on Greek entrepreneurship. at the Melas Mansion, Kotzias Square.
Ms. Bakoyannis is to address the forum at about 18:45, followed by a short address from the Turkish Foreign Minister.
On Tuesday evening, a private dinner, with limited attendance, will be hosted in honour of Mr. Babacan at the Foreign Minister’s residence.
Finally, on Wednesday morning, from about 08:15 to 09:00, Ms. Bakoyannis and Mr. Babacan will attend a working breakfast at the Grande Bretagne with representatives from SEV and the Foreign Economic Relations Board.
At about 10:30 on Wednesday, the Speaker of the Hellenic Parliament, Mr. Sioufas, will receive the Turkish Foreign Minister at his office.
Mr. Babacan will then go to the Maximos Mansion – at about 11:00 – where he will be received by His Excellency the Prime Minister of the Hellenic Republic, Mr. Kostas Karamanlis.
This meeting will bring Mr. Babacan’s official visit to Athens to a close. As you know, he will then pay a private visit to Komotini.
That’s it for the Turkish Foreign Minister’s visit on Tuesday and Wednesday.
On Wednesday, 5 December, Foreign Minister Ms. Bakoyannis will meet with Mr. Nimetz at 09:00.
At 11:00, Mr. Nimetz will meet with the head of the main opposition party, and at 12:00 he will be received by Prime Minister Mr. Karamanlis.
Also on Wednesday, at 13:00, the Foreign Minister will be received by the President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, Mr. Mubarak, who will be carrying out a visit to our country at the invitation of the President of the Republic, Mr. Karolos Papoulias. This visit will last from 3 to 6 December, and this meeting will take place at the Grande Bretagne. It will not be followed by statements, unless of course the Foreign Minister wants to say something to the representatives of the news media.
Late this week, on 6 and 7 December, the Foreign Minister will be in Brussels to participate in the Meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers.
The basic outline of the agenda for this Meeting is:
· Afghanistan
· Western Balkans – Kosovo
· Enlargement
· Adoption of a joint communiqué
· Public diplomacy
· Partnerships
· Russia, Ukraine, Georgia
Within the framework of this Meeting, there is to be a meeting between Ms. Rice and Ms. Bakoyannis.
From 7 to 9 December, Ms. Bakoyannis will be in Lisbon, accompanying Prime Minister Karamanlis to the European Union-Africa Summit. The agenda briefly:
· Governance and human rights
· Peace and security
· Migration
· Energy and climate change
· Trade
· Infrastructure and development
And I’ll finish up with 10 December – exactly a week from today. Ms. Bakoyannis will participate in the proceedings of the EU General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) in Brussels. She will be accompanied by Deputy Foreign Minister Mr. Valinakis. The agenda, in brief:
· External relations
· European Neighbourhood Policy
· Western Balkans with emphasis on Kosovo
· Middle East
· Lebanon
· Iran
· Myanmar
· Somalia
· Sudan
· Afghanistan
This meeting will also be in preparation for the meeting of the European Council – the EU Summit Meeting.
Also, on the night of Sunday, 9 December, Ms. Bakoyannis will attend and participate in a working dinner of the Foreign Ministers of the European People’s Party, in Brussels.
Regarding Deputy Foreign Minister Mr. Doukas’ programme, today, at 11:30, he will meet with Ukrainian Ambassador Mr. Valeriy Tsybukh.
Tomorrow, Tuesday, 4 December, Mr. Doukas will speak a the 18th annual conference of the Hellenic-American Chamber of Trade, on the subject of “The Greek Economy’s Time”.
On Wednesday, 5 December, at 10:00. Mr. Doukas will deliver a welcome address at the Greek-Arab Business Forum. Later the same day, at 16:00, he will carry out a visit to the Black Sea Trade and Development Bank in Thessaloniki. At 17:30, he will meet with members of the Business Advisory Council and representatives of the Greek business community, and at 19:30 he will deliver a welcome speech at an event marking the 10th anniversary of the founding of the Business Advisory Council. At 20:15, Mr. Doukas will meet with the head of the Investment Compact for Southeast Europe, Mr. Anthony O’Sullivan.
On Friday, 7 December, at 12:00, Mr. Doukas will meet with members of the Greek-Lebanese Business Council, and at 13:00 with members of the Greek-African Chamber of Commerce.
Regarding Deputy Foreign Minister Mr. Kassimis’ programme, on Tuesday and Wednesday, 4 and 5 December, he will be in Sharm el Sheikh, Egypt, to participate in the Meeting of EU and African Foreign Ministers.
From Friday to Sunday, 7 to 9 December, Mr. Kassimis will attend the Conference of the World Council of Hellenes Abroad (SAE) Board of Coordinating Councils. This will take place in Thessaloniki.
That’s all for announcements regarding the programme for the upcoming days. I am at your disposal to answer any questions you might have.
Mr. Gilson: Regarding the agenda for Mr. Babacan’s visit, I want to ask whether certain little issues will be included – among which are the opening of the Halki Seminary, the implementation of the Ankara Protocol – and whether there is any basis to the articles that have been published regarding Greece’s acceptance of the 6 miles; that is, relinquishing of the right to extend it to 12 miles in exchange for the Turkish Parliaments lifting the casus belli.
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: Within the framework of the course of Turkey’s European perspective, of course issues concerning respect for religious freedoms will be raised, along with other issues that, in any case, have been noted in the European Commission’s recent progress report. These issues include the Ankara Protocol and the extension of the Customs Union to all the member states of the European Union, without exception.
Regarding the reports you referred to, there is no such information – I have no such information. There are no such issues.
Ms. Howa: All this activity – Mubarak, Babacan – does it have anything to do with Kosovo, the results in Kosovo, something like that?
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: As you know, the Kosovo issue is an issue of regional and international interest, and of course it concerns the political leaderships of the states in the region and further afield. The course of this issue, precisely how we will proceed, is of necessity a subject of discussion in all international meetings – particularly at this time. This is an issue that concerns everyone.
Mr. Fourlis: The date of the Prime Minister’s visit – will it be discussed and finalised, or has it perhaps been finalised?
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: I have no information regarding finalisation. It is well known that in reciprocation of the visit carried out by Mr. Erdogan in 2004, there has always been an issue of a reciprocal visit on the part of Prime Minister Karamanlis. At this time, however, there is no finalised date. Moreover, the visits of the Prime Minister are not announced by the Foreign Ministry.
Mr. Santamouris.
Mr. Santamouris: In Ms. Bakoyannis’ discussions with the Egyptian delegation and Mr. Mubarak, will the issue be raised of cooperation on exploitation of sea zones? That’s one question.
And the second is whether we can have something more on the Minister’s statement, which repeated today that Greece has undertaken an initiative to facilitate the resolution of the name issue, to the benefit of both sides. Does the proposal contain something that we are not aware of so far, or is Greece trying to re-table a solution of mutual benefit?
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: In answer to your first question, you are aware that Greece and the neighbouring coastal states will at some point have to proceed to determining certain sea zones, such as the exclusive economic zone. You know that Mr. Valinakis had a series of meetings with the Libyan government on this subject. It is an issue that is also on the bilateral agenda with Egypt. But I have nothing further to add with regard to specific prospects or how soon things will move ahead or not.
Regarding your second question, I think there has been a misunderstanding here, that the reference to an initiative has to do with Greece’s recent initiative of submitting a set of ideas and proposals on the issue of bringing the Western Balkans closer to the European Union. We are simply saying that this initiative is part of and confirms Greece’s will and ability to consistently follow a strategic choice on its part, which is to bring the countries of the Western Balkans closer to Europe.
And the particular time was such that we said and argued – with a favourable response from our European partners and collocutors – that now is the right time to submit and move ahead with thoughts on a new move – new vitality in the approach of the Western Balkans towards the EU.
Mr. Meletis: Mr. Spokesman, without wanting to downplay the importance of the historical coincidence, I would like your comment on how, after 27 years – since 1980 – of Turkey’s requesting a change in the way the administrative committees for the Vakoufia are selected, today, by coincidence, on the day of Mr. Babacan’s arrival, this bill is being submitted to Parliament.
And second, how do you interpret the fact that Mr. Babacan – coincidentally, once again – expressed the desire to pay a private visit to Thrace, and not to some other popular destination in Greece?
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: I’ll start with your first question. The announcement of specific measures for further strengthening the already strong and implemented policy of equal rights and equality before the law in the region of Thrace for the Muslim minority were announced about a year ago. Following their political announcement, as you can understand, there is the corresponding preparation or drawing up of legislation and the procedural stages, which are provided for.
If you will, there is no new element in this, in the sense that the Cabinet had already discussed and approved the content of the relevant bill some time in July. Since then, as far as I have been informed, because I had to look into what the normal procedure is in preparation of legislation, it went to the General Accounting Office.
You are aware of the procedures that exist at the General Accounting Office, sometimes there are delays, but please take into account the Parliamentary elections we had in the meantime. The coincidence you refer to is nothing more that that: a coincidence. There is nothing in it.
What was your second question?
Mr. Meletis: (off microphone) As the Foreign Ministry, how do you interpret the timing of this visit to Thrace?
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: As a democratic state, we do not try to interpret the desires of visitors to our country to visit any place in Greece.
And as I perceive the innuendo of your question – so that we won’t have a new question on this, and a new answer – I want to take a clear position. Greece has nothing to hide with regard to respect of the rights of minorities. In fact, it has much to show – much that can be taken as a model for emulation.
Mr. Fourlis: So why didn’t you inform us in a timely manner of this part of the visit – despite your being aware of it – leaving us to be informed first by the Turkish Foreign Ministry?
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: As you can see, any official announcement from the Foreign Ministry regarding the Turkish Foreign Minister’s visit to Greece has to do with the official part of his visit. There is no question of announcing anything else before the announcement of the official visit. As far as the Foreign Ministry and the Greek government are concerned, Mr. Babacan is coming for the official visit. So the announcement was made when the official part of the visit was finalised – that’s the way it works. The announcement was supplemented with the information regarding the private part of the visit. There was no negligence on our part.
Mr. Fourlis: Excuse me, a clarification. Was the Thrace decision taken afterwards? That is, was there a programme for Athens, with the Thrace visit added on afterwards?
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: As I said – and I will stand on the answer I gave you – the announcement regarding Mr. Babacan’s official visit was made when we had all the necessary information. To this announcement was added the information regarding the private part of the visit. As you can see, the government and the Foreign Ministry give greater weight to the official visit.
Mr. Meletis: Excuse me, Mr. Spokesman. If this is the case, why has the Foreign Ministry – and I can bring you many announcements, including ones you have made – reacted whenever Turkish Foreign Ministry announcements have come out concerning the Muslim minority – the “Turkish” minority, as they call it – in Thrace? Why does it react when Greece has nothing to hide, essentially presenting Mr. Babacan as inspecting the situation, given that, as you said, “we have nothing to hide, but much to show”? So why does the Foreign Ministry react to the constant announcements made by the Turkish Foreign Ministry, when the policy of the Turkish Foreign Ministry and how it sees the Greek Muslim minority is well known?
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: Mr. Meletis, I was simply referring to the carrying out of the visit in question, which, I repeat, is private. It is outside the framework of the official visit. I also stated our basic position; that is, that we have nothing to hide.
You ask me why we take a stance when there are similar statements of substance from the other side. I answer you: Whenever we judge that there is an issue of substance that concerns specific issues on which the Foreign Ministry must take a position, we take a clear stance. But there is no issue of our taking a stance on the carrying out of this particular private visit. They are different things.
Mr. Meletis: When it is put into practice – excuse me, I’m winding up – that is, when the issue of well-known claims regarding the Muslim minority is raised in practice, it doesn’t bother you when the Minister himself goes there, you’re just bothered by the announcement. Is that what you’re saying?
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: That is not what I’m saying, Mr. Meletis.
Mr. Meletis: .. Or, for example, is the right of civil servant status for pseudo-muftis an instance of meddling in our domestic affairs, or not? That’s what I’m asking. What is the Foreign Ministry’s position.
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: Let’s be clear on this. First, I said nothing like that. What I am stressing is that when there are stances of substance, there are corresponding stances of substance from the Greek side.
The discussion taking place at this time is focusing, I am afraid, on this visit by Mr. Babacan to Thrace. So I stress once again that within the framework of a democratic state, Greece – proud of its minority policy – has no reason to be concerned or to refuse a visit to any part of Greece.
This has to do with this visit itself. When there are stances of substance that concern views, positions and policies, and it is judged that a Foreign Ministry stance should be taken, one is always taken.
Ms. Adam: On this subject, so that we can close out the section on Mr. Babacan’s private visit, has the Turkish Foreign Ministry informed ours of what Mr. Babacan will visit during this visit; how many hours he will stay, what institutions or places he will visit, etc.? That’s one question.
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: I have been informed that this visit will last a few hours. Beyond that, the Foreign Ministry knows about the official visit. As the Greek state, it has all the information its needs to have on the private part of the visit as well, but this is not a Foreign Ministry issue.
Ms. Adam: Just to finish this up. So the Turkish Foreign Ministry did not inform its Greek counterpart regarding what Mr. Babacan will do in a region of Greece that he will visit privately.
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: Ms. Adam, I gave a specific answer.
Ms. Adam: In the same way, the man could go to Zoniana to see what is happening first hand. He would inform you of where he was going, why. Practical matters.
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: I gave very specific answers that show how this particular issue is being handled. As the Foreign Ministry spokesman, I do not intend to discuss the private part of a visit before there is any reason for it to be commented on. I will not make comments on hypothetical events.
Greece is a modern, European democracy. It follows and implements the rules of any European and modern democracy. Mr. Babacan can freely visit any part of Greece that he decides to visit. Moreover, I believe that there is the necessary sound judgment and the spirit imposed by the general atmosphere in Greek-Turkish relations and the efforts being made to further improve these relations.
Ms. Adam: Mr. Spokesman, I didn’t ask for a comment. I asked whether the Turkish Foreign Ministry has informed you of the itinerary of the Turkish Minister’s private visit to a place in Greece. Any place in Greece. I assume that when we go somewhere privately, the corresponding Foreign Ministry knows precisely where we will go and what we will do.
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: There is obviously nothing secret about Mr. Babacan’s visit to Thrace. The Greek government knows the details of his visit.
Ms. Adam: I asked you to tell us where he will be going, Mr. Spokesman.
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: I will not enter into a discussion of the private part of Mr. Babacan’s visit. The Foreign Ministry does not announce private visits and their itineraries.
Ms. Adam: Have you been informed? I’m asking whether the Turkish Foreign Ministry has given you information. What you will do with it, whether or not you will give it to us, is an issue of another order. Whether the Turkish Foreign Ministry has briefed you.
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: I answered. There is nothing secret about Mr. Babacan’s visit.
As you know – so that we can have done with this issue, and I think we can have done with it because all of us in this room and in this process understand each other – there was a visit some years ago, in 2004, of the Turkish Prime Minister to the same area. Let me remind you that at that time as well, various concerns, worries and thoughts were voiced by the news media. The visit took place and went smoothly.
Ms. Adam: Allow me to move on to the official part of the visit. To the section on Euro-Turkish issues, which will be discussed in any case. Has the Greek government already consented to the opening of two more negotiation chapters with Turkey in December? One question.
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: There are two chapters for negotiation – Chapter 21, on “Trans-European networks”, and Chapter 28, which concerns “Consumers and Protection of Health”.
With regard to the contents of these two chapters, at this time there is no point of substance that Greece considers an obstacle to their being opened. The procedure provided for can move ahead.
Ms. Adam: The second issue will obviously be discussed. It is the proposals of French President Sarkozy and the “committee of wise men” and the European future of Turkey, as well as the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Can you give us Greece’s overall stance on Sarkozy’s proposals? Regarding the Turkish issue, I mean.
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: The issue of future enlargements and the future of the enlargement policy in general is an ongoing concern of the European Union. As you know, enlargements are a very important aspect of the process of European integration. So they are clearly an issue of concern.
Greece has taken a stance in principle, saying that enlargement cannot be an endless process in space and time. At the same time, we have added that the accession processes already in effect must be completed as provided for.
There are prerequisites, there are criteria, there is a complete mechanism for assessing the performance of candidate countries, and this of course holds true in the case of Turkey.
This is the Greek position, and you are aware of it. I don’t think we need to repeat a phrase that describes the substance of our policy on this particular issue. That is, full compliance with these criteria can lead to full accession. This is our position, and it will remain so.
This holds true for Turkey as well. It also holds true for the processes that have begun for the countries of the Western Balkans. Beyond that, the broader concern regarding the course of the enlargement policy is, of course, very real and legitimate. We are participating in the evaluation of this issue, and, as I said, in principle the enlargement of the European Union cannot be an endless process in space and time.
Ms. Adam: (off microphone)...
Excuse me, I want to clarify something. From the Sarkozy proposal, you only accept the point relating to enlargements other than Turkey and the Western Balkans. That is, which other countries will enter the European Union? Because it is reaching its geographical limits.
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: As you know, there is a lot of talk about the European Neighbourhood Policy and a series of other states that have officially expressed the wish to come closer or accede to the European Union.
Beyond that, with regard to the wider concern, the French President’s positions are mostly focused on the issue of Europe’s borders, the topic of a wider political discussion. It is precisely because this is a wider issue with many aspects that the French proposal was made for a committee of wise men to be set up in order to evaluate this major, serious political question.
Ms. Kourbella: My question does not regard Turkey. If another colleague wants to ask about Turkey, I will ask my question later. Mr. Spokesman, I would like to ask a question about Africa. The United Kingdom placed the issue of EU-Africa relations at the top of its EU Presidency agenda. The German Presidency also kept it at a good level on the agenda, and now the Portuguese Presidency is holding the first EU-Africa Summit. Why is the European Union so interested in Africa, and is there any special interest on the part of Greece? Thank you very much.
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: You know that the Presidency is currently held by Portugal – a country with its own interest in developments in the wider region of Africa and, in particular, northern Africa – but there is also a wider interest on the part of the European Union.
There is a series of issues of concern related with the European Union’s relations with African countries in matters of security, promoting economic development, addressing new forms of problems such as illegal immigration, and a host of other issues.
Greece – as a European Mediterranean country – is particularly interested in the development of these relations also within the framework of Europe’s more general and serious interest in developments in, and relations with, the countries of Africa. Greece is taking part in the next Summit, represented at the highest political level by its Prime Minister. This is also indicative of our interest.
Ms. Rigou: I would like to ask for a comment on the letter addressed to US Secretary of State Ms. Condoleezza Rice, in which two US Congressmen point out that it should have been an opportunity to settle the differences between Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia on the name issue.
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: We hope that Mr. Nimetz’s visit to the two capitals will be positive for his further efforts to achieve a mutually acceptable solution.
This hope is mainly directed at our neighbouring country. We hope that it will take all these actions – all these evaluations – that will allow substantial progress and, ultimately, a definitive mutually acceptable solution to this pending issue.
I understand that the letter of the two Congressmen moves in this direction.
Ms. Rigou: With regard to this matter – if we put aside the name issue – do you think that the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia fulfils the conditions for NATO accession?
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: There is an evaluation process that is under way. In any case, we will see how it moves ahead. We have, however, repeatedly said that there is still a long way to go, both overall and particularly with regard to all the other issues and, naturally, on the pivotal issue of good neighbourly relations.
Mr. Gilson: With regard to the proposals that Mr. Nimetz presented on 1 November in New York, we heard Mr. Gruevski’s public reaction, when he said that he cannot accept a change in the constitutional name at an international level. Is Greece, first of all, satisfied with the proposals and the framework that has been set in principle in New York?
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: We have repeatedly stressed – and I will not deviate from this position at all – that, whatever the Greek government has to say on the set of ideas put forward by Mr. Nimetz on 1 November in New York, it will say it directly to him, out of respect for the confidentiality of the process, as Mr. Nimetz himself has said.
Beyond that, the Greek side has always said – and I think that it was very clearly noted in the Foreign Minister’s recent interview in a Skopje daily – that now is the time; now there are possibilities for us to move ahead consistently and according to European principles and values. Here, I would like to add that apart from European principles and values, there is also the European way. The European way of decision-making through consensus and convergence. This way must be a model for the neighbouring country.
Mr. Gilson: I’m sorry, there is something else. You mentioned in your announcements that there will be some sort of agreement or discussion on the second Greek-Turkish executive education programme, I don’t know what this is. Could you explain to us whether it has something to do with the re-writing of the textbooks that were agreed between Messrs. Papandreou and Cem or whether it is something else.
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: The second protocol follows the same logic as the first one. It will be signed at the level of Ministry officials, as I told you.
Mr. Gilson: I’m sorry, what are all these protocols? I, personally, don’t know what they are and many colleagues might also not know them.
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: I don’t have their exact content here with me. They are cooperation protocols within the framework of the two countries’ relations. I don’t think there is anything beyond that, it follows the logic of a practice of educational and cultural…
Mr. Gilson: What is the link with the textbooks?
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: Do not raise an issue of textbooks. It has nothing to do with it, in the form that you are trying to link the two.
Mr. Meletis: One of my questions, that has been noted, has remained unanswered. I would like to ask this question again. Do you think that Mr. Babacan’s meeting with the two pseudo-muftis within the framework of his private visit to Thrace is a friendly move? I asked you before and I would like an answer to that.
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: I did not notice that you asked such a question before. I wasn’t evading a question.
As I had the opportunity of saying, Greece is a European democratic country, anyone can meet with anyone they like.
Beyond that, you understand that these issues are the subject of evaluation. This is a reality and beyond that, there is no need to create a sense of dramatisation.
Ms. Tsaka: I would like to mention the hottest issue of our region. Only a week is left until the deadline for the negotiations between Belgrade and Pristina. We see no outcome from these negotiations, an initiative on the part of the European Union is then left. What is Greece’s initiative? Will it align itself with the initiative from EU member states such as Germany and France?
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: I understand. Indeed, at the moment, we are witnessing a failure of the two sides to reach agreement. We are awaiting the findings of the Troika, possibly in the next few days and in any event, before the GAERC. These findings will in all probability be put forward to the UN Secretary General. With regard to the European Union, there will then be a detailed briefing by Mr. Ischinger at the GAERC.
Mr. Meletis: On 10 December?
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: There is a scheduled briefing by Mr. Ischinger at the 10 December Council regarding the current state of play. The information and hypotheses that are being heard on potential unilateral moves have not been officially set out within the framework of EU discussions.
Greece, as you know, has always argued and continues to argue that solutions for stability are a result of dialogue, not coercion. We have also added that the unity of the European Union on this particular issue is extremely important.
Greece is taking part in EU processes by helping to shape decisions. The starting point of Greek positions has been repeatedly stated. We believe in the need for solutions to go through dialogue. We believe in the greatest possible legitimacy and in the fact that the safest way to find it is to go through the Security Council. The other parameter is the particular importance that we attribute to the stabilizing role that the European Union can and should play in the region.
Ms. Tsaka: Finally, Mr. Koumoutsakos, in an interview, the Albanian leader stated that Greece has the major opportunity to take an initiative in favour of Albanians on the Kosovo issue. What are the positive elements, that is, could… ?
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: I see. Greece has overall a clear, carefully thought out policy, which is the result of all the things that I just mentioned and also of the recently proposed initiative. I have no comment, and I have nothing further to add with regard to the statements that you mentioned.
Ms. Adam: On the same issue, you mentioned the three principles governing Greece’s position, possibly…
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: Guidelines. Axes, if you like.
Ms. Adam: Yes, axes on the Kosovo issue. Would Greece, however, for reasons of principle and also for reasons of national interest, be willing to accept, in time, a development such as independence or some other development that would not come out of a UN Security Council resolution, but would instead sidestep it?
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: I mentioned that one of the three guidelines is that we believe in the greatest possible legitimacy and that the safest way is the Security Council. At the moment, there is a discussion and in the next few days there will be an effort to jointly shape a European position. Greece will take part in these discussions based on these starting points.
Ms. Adam: Even if the European Union’s position is not in line with and does not follow a UN Security Council resolution, which we might even not see?
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: Let us hear what Mr. Ischinger has to say and let the discussion develop. In any event, I mentioned Greece’s starting positions. It is based on these that we are going to enter into a discussion with our partners. I would not like to take a stance on hypothetical – as yet – scenarios.
Ms. Spanou: I would like to come back to Greek-Turkish issues. I would like to ask whether the Foreign Ministry is recommending that Mr. Karamanlis’ visit to Turkey include a private part, for example a visit to Imvros?
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: As I told you, the preparation for this particular visit has not yet begun. There isn’t anything to announce at the moment.
Mr. Vidalis: Previously, when Mr. Meletis asked you about Mr. Babacan’s visit to Thrace, on his meetings with the pseudo-muftis, you said that these issues are the subject of evaluation. Of course. I have a question to ask. Mr. Erdogan, in his two or three meetings with the Greek Prime Minister, raised the issue of the “Turkish minority” and the protection of its rights. Mr. Gul visited Thrace while he was Foreign Minister and raised the same issue. How have these issues been evaluated so far?
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: Based on Greece’s well-known positions, which are fully in agreement with what is provided for in the Lausanne Treaty, and based on the Greek state’s stance on the issue of respect for minority rights, which - as I told you – is, in our view, an example to follow.
You are aware of our more detailed positions. We had the opportunity before to mention all the measures and the implementation of this whole policy of equal rights and equality before the law.
They are clear. They are compliant with the Lausanne Treaty. There is nothing more to add. The Turkish side has its own views.
Ms. Fryssa: What is your comment on a potential move from the Skopje government to change the name of their airport as an act of good will?
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: There is some information in the neighbouring country’s press. I do not know if it corresponds to reality or not. In any event, I have already taken a stance on that.
It is not an element that can lead to a review or a revision of Greece’s well-known policy, which focuses on the substance of the issue.
Mr. Athanassopoulos: I would like to ask a question with regard to the Kosovo issue that we were discussing before. To follow up on Ms. Adam’s question basically, reports have been published on Mr. Solana’s meetings with the UN Secretary General. In some of these reports it was mentioned that one of Mr. Solana’s proposals was to bypass the Security Council with some sort of decision/opinion of the UN Secretary General. In order to take such an initiative, Mr. Solana must obviously have some sort of – even indirect – legitimacy from European institutions. Is the Greek government aware of that and what would be its stance on such an initiative? Thank you.
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: We will see all that when the discussion starts on shaping a final European position on this issue.
Mr. Santamouris: What I would like to ask, Mr. Koumoutsakos, is the following: About a year ago, Mr. Babacan was here in the capacity of Turkey’s EU negotiator.
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: As far as I am aware, he still is.
Mr. Santamouris: Yes. Back then, he was not Foreign Minister and had clearly made an effort to raise the issue of a Turkish minority, in his own view, and link Turkey’s obligations with Greek exchanges to Turkey. My question is therefore whether Mr. Babacan’s current additional capacity changes something in relation to what he stated then, i.e., whether in his new capacity he will not make such statements in your opinion. My second question is whether the very recent ECHR judgment, in which Greece is found responsible for restricting the Muslims’ ability to set up an association determined as Turkish, changes something. Thank you.
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: There is a Turkish policy on this issue – well-known with regard to its parameters and characteristics. There is an equally well-known Greek policy with regard to its parameters and characteristics. It is based on these that the Greek government takes a position whenever it is required.
Mr. Santamouris: (off microphone)... That means it also concerns the ECHR judgment…
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: Would you please clarify?
Mr. Santamouris:(off microphone)... Will there be a change in Mr. Babacan’s position given that the European Court condemned Greece for prohibiting ….
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: You are asking me whether Mr. Babacan’s position will change based on a fact. I cannot know that, and I am not Mr. Babacan’s spokesman.
Ms. Rigou: I would like to come back to the issue of FYROM in view of the Nimetz visit.
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: Yes.
Ms. Rigou: Skopje and Athens. Ms. Bakoyannis has repeatedly pointed out that we have covered half the distance needed in order to achieve consensus on the name issue. On the other hand, the Prime Minister stated that we have not made a single step back with regard to the name issue. Which of the two is true?
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: The Greek position is well known. We have indeed covered half the distance to meet the other side halfway. The other side remains persistently intransigent.
I would like to take this opportunity to repeat that Greece – and this is proven and confirmed by the initiative that we recently undertook – can and wants to be an advocate, can take the neighbouring country by the hand, if you will, on its course towards the European Union and NATO.
We can and we want to do this, on condition, of course, that a mutually acceptable solution is found and the neighbouring country’s constructive stance is noted and that it abandons a whole policy of statements and actions that are statements and actions of an irredentist reasoning.
The persistent intransigence is making our neighbouring country miss out. It is missing out on the benefits that it would have from settling these issues in a mutually acceptable way on the name issue and from abandoning a particular policy once and for all.
Ms. Rigou: I meant Mr. Karamanlis when I spoke of the Prime Minister.
Mr. G. Koumoutsakos: I told you what Greece’s position is. Are you saying that there is a divergence of views? It is obvious to all that there isn’t and never has been even a hint of a divergence of views. There is no question of that.
Thank you very much.